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The Absurdity of Crime-Based 
Deportation 
Kari Hong∗ 
The belief that immigrants are crossing the border, in the stealth of 
night, with nefarious desires to bring violence, crime, and drugs to the 
United States has long been part of the public imagination. Studies and 
statistics overwhelmingly establish the falsehood of this rhetoric. The facts 
are that non-citizens commit fewer crimes and reoffend less often than 
citizens. But facts do not stop the myth. Even supporters of immigration 
reform often will point out that they will help deserving immigrants but 
will deport the undeserving ones, particularly those with criminal 
convictions, and especially those who committed violent crimes. 
Despite the new administration’s call to deport up to three million 
criminals, my Article counters that there will be — and should be — an 
end to crime-based deportation. It is already happening quickly and 
quietly in federal courts. Beginning in 2013, the Supreme Court decided 
United States v. Descamps, and in 2016, Mathis v. United States. These 
cases are highly technical decisions relating to the federal Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“ACCA”) and immigration law’s Illegal Immigration and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”). 
This Article draws upon empirical data to show that, as predicted by the 
Justices, a faithful adherence to Descamps and Mathis will eliminate 
numerous offenses from having ACCA and IIRIRA consequences on a case-
by-case, statute-by-statute basis. 
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As a normative matter, I contend that this result is the proper one. 
Prosecutors, judges, and policy makers are embracing this reality in the 
ACCA context. The same result should be embraced in the immigration 
context. IIRIRA’s reliance on convictions to serve as immigration 
violations is too arbitrary, too expensive, and simply out of proportion to 
how the criminal courts considered the seriousness (or lack thereof) of the 
crime. Instead, Congress must repeal IIRIRA and return to a system 
whereby criminal offenders were subjected to individualized assessments. 
Those who made more contributions to the country stayed, and those who 
did not, left. The experiment of presuming that a conviction is a marker of 
character has failed. Immigration law must return to grading crimes by 
their actual seriousness instead of assuming that categories of crimes 
adequately sort out who should or should not remain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The belief that immigrants are crossing the border, in the stealth of 
night, with nefarious desires to bring violence, crime, and drugs to the 
United States has long been part of the public imagination. In 1994, 
this imagery was used in a notorious commercial in support of 
California’s Proposition 187, an anti-immigration voter initiative 
(which passed by nearly 60% of the vote but was struck down by 
federal courts).1 Donald Trump ratcheted up the rhetoric during the 
2016 presidential campaign, calling Mexican nationals “rapists” and 
“killers” and promising to stop this newly-defined national problem of 
immigrants who cross the border to kill Americans.2 Indeed, in his 
first interview after the election, President-Elect Trump promised to 
round up and deport3 up to three million non-citizens who had 
committed crimes.4 In one of his first significant acts as president, he 
enacted executive orders that expand the types of crimes that can 
serve as the basis for deportation.5 
 
 1 California Proposition 187, Illegal Aliens Ineligible for Public Benefits (1994), 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_187,_Illegal_Aliens_Ineligible_ 
for_Public_Benefits_(1994) (last visited Feb. 4, 2017). Pete Wilson’s ad displayed the 
caption “Border Crossing” and showed video of people running, with the voiceover “they 
keep coming” and Governor Wilson’s promise that “enough is enough.” PeteWilsonCA, 
Pete Wilson 1994 Campaign Ad on Illegal Immigration, YOUTUBE (Feb. 15, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lLIzzs2HHgY. 
 2 See Cathleen Decker, In Immigration Speech, Donald Trump Spurns Softened Tone and 
Threatens Republican Future, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.latimes. 
com/politics/la-na-pol-donald-trump-immigration-analysis-20160901-snap-story.html (“He 
said that his immediate priority as president would be deporting those undocumented 
immigrants involved in crimes . . . .”); Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False 
Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-
comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime; CNN, Donald Trump on Trade, 
Healthcare and More (CNN interview with Jake Tapper), YOUTUBE (June 28, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8fT7Np6PFao#t=4m53s. 
 3 After 1996, Congress ended the use of the term “deportation” and replaced it 
with the term “removal” to describe the order from an immigration court directing a 
non-citizen to depart the country. Deportation, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/deportation (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
Although the terms have specific legal meanings and are not always interchangeable, I 
will use the term “deportation” in this Article to reflect the term that is used by the 
general population. 
 4 Emily Schultheis, President-Elect Trump Says How Many Immigrants He’ll Deport, 
CBS NEWS (Nov. 13, 2016, 10:32 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-elect-
trump-says-how-many-immigrants-hell-deport/. 
 5 See Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Exec. Order No. 
13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); Memorandum on Enforcement of the 
Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland 
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The studies and statistics overwhelmingly establish the falsehood of 
this rhetoric. The facts are that non-citizens commit fewer crimes and 
reoffend less often than citizens.6 And, the facts also show that there 
are not three million non-citizens with criminal convictions that 
President Trump could target for deportation.7 But facts do not stop 
the myth. Even those who support immigration reform often will be 
quick to point out that they want to help deserving immigrants but 
will deport the undeserving ones, those with criminal convictions, and 
especially those who committed violent crimes. 
My Article counters that there will be — and should be — an end to 
crime-based deportation. It is already happening quickly and quietly 
in federal courts. Moreover, I suggest that as a normative matter, using 
criminal convictions as proxies to determine who can stay and who 
must leave is a doomed project: it is arbitrary, disproportionate, and 
unnecessary. 
In Part I, I begin with a discussion of two specific federal laws that 
have led to a remarkable reform in federal courts. The 1984 Armed 
 
Sec., to Kevin McAleenan et al., Acting Comm’r, Customs & Border Prot. (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-
Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf; Memorandum on Implementing the 
President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvement Policies from John 
Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan et al., Acting Comm’r, Customs 
& Border Prot. (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-
Improvement-Policies.pdf. 
 6 See Philip Bump, Surprise! Donald Trump Is Wrong About Immigrants and Crime, 
WASH. POST (July 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/ 
07/02/surprise-donald-trump-is-wrong-about-immigrants-and-crime/ (citing studies 
and results from multiple sources showing that there is “no correlation” between 
immigration and violent crime and that incarceration rates among young men are 
lowest for immigrant populations); Alex Nowrasteh, Immigration and Crime — What 
the Research Says, CATO INST. (July 14, 2015, 11:49 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/ 
immigration-crime-what-research-says (“[I]mmigrants are less crime prone than the 
native-born population.”). 
 7 The non-partisan Migration Policy Institute has estimated that, based on 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data from 2012, in 2015 there were 820,000 
undocumented individuals with criminal convictions and 1.1 million lawful 
permanent residents (or individuals with other legal status) with criminal convictions. 
Muzaffar Chishti & Michelle Mittelstadt, Unauthorized Immigrants with Criminal 
Convictions: Who Might Be a Priority for Removal?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Nov. 2016), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/unauthorized-immigrants-criminal-convictions-
who-might-be-priority-removal. 37% were felony convictions, 47% were serious 
misdemeanors (defined as more than a 90-day sentence in custody), and the 
remaining 16% presumably were less serious than misdemeanors with a 90-day 
sentence. See id.  
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Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)8 and the Illegal Immigrant 
Responsibility and Immigration Reform Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”)9 have 
schemes whereby collateral consequences — substantially increased 
federal sentences (ACCA) and potential and actual deportation 
(IIRIRA) — will attach if the person has a prior conviction for a 
different crime. These statutes are from the Tough on Crime era and 
add more than simply “direct consequences” to an offense, which the 
American Bar Association defines as a component of a sentence that 
the legislature authorized and the criminal court imposed at the time 
of punishment.10 
In contrast to direct consequences, ACCA and IIRIRA are examples 
of statutes that impose collateral consequences.11 A collateral 
consequence is a “penalty, disability, or disadvantage” that attaches 
(either by mandate or by discretion) to a criminal conviction — not by 
the sentencing court, but by legislatures, agencies, and officials in 
mostly civil contexts.12 Under ACCA, if someone commits a federal 
firearm offense, instead of being punished for that particular crime, he 
or she will be subjected to at least an additional fifteen-year mandatory 
minimum prison sentence if he or she committed prior offenses that 
Congress has defined to be a crime of violence or involving controlled 
substances.13 The prior offense attaches no matter which jurisdiction it 
occurred in and no matter how remote in time.14 In an era when 
recidivism was believed to be a social ill, ACCA was the cure. 
IIRIRA typically is not thought of as imposing collateral 
consequences because it is an entire scheme that regulates entries, 
admissions, and violations of immigration law. But its provisions 
related to criminal convictions very much are. Historically, 
 
 8 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2012).  
 9 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
 10 See AM. BAR ASSOC., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING 18-2.2, 
18-3.1–.22 (3d ed. 1994). 
 11 There are currently up to 50,000 collateral consequences that may attach when 
someone is convicted of a felony, which include numerous civil disadvantages such as 
the loss of voting rights, denial of housing, discrimination in employment, and 
disqualification from educational loans. See United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 
179, 184, 190-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (listing the collateral consequences). 
 12 See AM. BAR ASSOC., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL 
SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATIONS OF CONVICTED PERSONS 19-1.1 (3d 
ed. 2004) [hereinafter COLLATERAL SANCTIONS]. 
 13 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (attaching consequences for three prior qualifying 
offenses).  
 14 See id. 
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immigration law graded crimes based on how the criminal courts 
treated them. Crimes that state courts considered minor, not meriting 
lengthy sentences, or expunged under state law did not have 
immigration consequences.15 IIRIRA changed that scheme. IIRIRA 
replaced the measured, individualized determinations with a new legal 
framework that subjected non-citizens to deportation by lumping 
types of crimes into crude categories, attaching consequences based on 
potential — and not actual — sentence length, no longer recognizing 
the lines between felony and misdemeanor and vacated versus 
continuing offenses, and no longer offering second chances to those 
whose equities outweighed their mistakes.16 As a result, a college 
 
 15 Prior to IIRIRA, for non-citizens convicted of crimes, “[i]n determining 
discretionary relief, the BIA considered a wide range of equitable factors, including the 
seriousness of the offense, evidence of rehabilitation or recidivism, and the impact of 
deportation on the family.” Tyson v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 2012). 
Prior to IIRIRA, immigration law did not attach consequences to adjudications when 
the criminal court had accounted for mitigating circumstances in the plea, form of 
adjudication, length of sentence, type of sentence, and post-conviction relief in the 
form of expungements and pardons. By contrast, after IIRIRA,  
[t]he INA’s definition of conviction qualifies nearly every Maryland 
adjudication, apart from a ‘stet’ or diversion, as a conviction. Mere 
unsupervised probation would constitute a form of punishment. Deferred 
adjudications, such as a probation before judgment conviction pursuant to 
Art. 27 §641, would remain a conviction for immigration purposes, even 
after the District or Circuit court had dismissed the conviction. A criminal 
offense expunged, pursuant to Art. 27 §735, similarly would be recognized 
as a conviction for immigration purposes. Juvenile adjudications are not 
grounds of deportation as they are seen as civil adjudications and usually not 
a grounds for inadmissibility except where the offense involved drug 
trafficking. A juvenile convicted in adult court will be vulnerable to removal. 
The INA does not recognize sentencing distinctions between time served and 
time suspended.  
Rex B. Wingerter, Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 37 MD. B.J. 20, 24 (2004) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 16 See, e.g., Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 836 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., 
concurring) (“If anything is clear it’s that ‘crime of moral turpitude’ shouldn’t be 
defined by invoking broad categorical rules that sweep in harmless conduct. Yet that’s 
what the Board of Immigration Appeals did in this case . . . .”); Castillo v. Att’y Gen., 
756 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014) (upholding BIA’s decision that under IIRIRA, a 
state pardon did not meet the heightened requirement to excuse immigration 
consequences of the conviction that no longer exists outside of immigration law); 
Tyson v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Before 1996, the INA 
allowed a permanent resident alien who had been convicted of a certain type of crime, 
but who had at least seven years of residence, to apply for discretionary relief from 
deportation pursuant to § 212(c). In determining discretionary relief, the BIA 
considered a wide range of equitable factors, including the seriousness of the offense, 
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student who urinates in public, who is convicted of a misdemeanor 
public indecency crime, and whose conviction is expunged under state 
law will be treated identically to a child molester who willfully preys 
on children in public. 
The greatest value of a criminal statute is that it does cover both 
minor and serious conduct and lets the prosecutor charge and 
sentencing court impose the appropriate sentence. A prosecutor and 
criminal court judge will absolutely seek and impose a harsh sentence 
for the child molester who bears markers of being a public danger but 
will give the proverbial slap on the wrist for the drunken college 
student whose actions are borne of stupidity.17 But, under immigration 
law, both the child molester and the college student are treated the 
same. Under IIRIRA, they committed the identical “sex offense,” 
which merits the denial or stripping away of legal status. 
The fundamental problem with collateral consequences, and 
IIRIRA’s reliance on them, is that they impose an additional penalty 
for a crime in a separate context that is not willing or able to 
 
evidence of rehabilitation or recidivism, and the impact of deportation on the 
family. . . . Historically, an extremely large class of aliens qualified for discretionary 
relief and ‘a substantial percentage of their applications for § 212(c) relief have been 
granted.’” (citations omitted)); Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 688-90 (9th Cir. 
2011) (en banc) (agreeing with sister circuits and BIA that first-time drug possession 
offenses expunged under state statutes are a conviction for immigration purposes 
unless they were imposed before the date of this decision issued on July 14, 2011. The 
Court permitted non-citizens with convictions adjudged while Lujan-Armandariz v. 
INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000), was in effect to continue to receive the benefit of 
the Federal First Offender Act); Biskupski v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 274, 280 (3d Cir. 
2007) (observing that in a prior case, “the Court considered ‘whether a misdemeanor 
can be an “aggravated felony” under a provision of federal law even if it is not, 
technically speaking, a felony at all.’ We answered that question in the affirmative and 
determined that a misdemeanor theft could be an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(G)”); Avendano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 187 F. App’x 711, 715 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“An aggravated felony is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) as ‘a crime of 
violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.’ Section 
1101(a)(48)(A) defines the term ‘conviction’ to include nolo contendre pleas followed 
by ‘some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty.’ Section § 
1101(a)(48)(B), in turn, provides that ‘[a]ny reference to a term of imprisonment or a 
sentence . . . is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered 
by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that 
imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.’ It is clear from the record that 
Avendano entered a plea of nolo contendre and received a three-year suspended 
sentence and five years of probation. This squarely qualifies as a conviction of an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).”).  
 17 See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not 
to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2010); Kate Stith, The Arc of the 
Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008). 
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distinguish the degrees of harm swept up by criminal law. Direct 
consequences are related in a meaningful way to the underlying crime 
or to the offender’s future rehabilitation. A person convicted of a DUI 
may be ordered to abstain from alcohol as a condition of probation but 
a person convicted of another crime not involving substance abuse 
often will not.18 But collateral consequences, inherent to their nature, 
have no gradations or nuance, rendering them arbitrary and often 
disproportionate to the original crime. The current immigration law is 
failing in sorting out the dangerous from the non-dangerous 
individuals. In a rush to get the “bad guys” and “bad hombres” out, 
the law sweeps in too many people, which leads to absurdity. For 
example, a man who had been in the United States with a green card 
for forty years was deported over stealing a $2 can of beer.19 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed the deportation on a technical matter, but the case 
illustrates that figuring out who is dangerous and who is not based on 
a criminal record is not an efficient or effective method of immigration 
enforcement. 
Part II looks at the practical reality of how the Supreme Court is 
quietly and effectively ending crime-based deportation. In 2013, in 
Descamps v. United States,20 Michael Descamps was convicted of the 
federal crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Without 
ACCA, a federal judge would impose a sentence between zero and ten 
years, depending on the existing mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances of the possession offense. But that was not the sentence 
Mr. Descamps was facing. Mr. Descamps had a prior California 
burglary offense, which under ACCA, triggered a fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum sentence as a crime of violence. The prosecutor 
alleged that the California offense matched ACCA’s generic definition 
of a burglary (unlawful entry of a residence with intent to commit a 
crime) because California criminalized an unlawful entry in defining 
the crime under state law. The Supreme Court disagreed. In a 
technical decision, the Court set forth a three-step framework to 
 
 18 See generally People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545, 549 (Cal. 1975) (California requires 
conditions of probation to be related to the past or future criminal activity). Other 
states have found that alcohol use, even if not involved in the crime, may relate to 
rehabilitation. See, e.g., State v. Corbin, 184 P.3d 287, 288 (Mont. 2008) (upholding 
probation condition prohibiting alcohol even though alcohol was not involved in the 
crime). 
 19 See Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that, 
where the BIA had removed a 42-year-old lawful permanent resident who had been in 
the country since he was four years old because he shoplifted a $2 can of beer, the 
offense was not an aggravated felony because the offense was indivisible). 
 20 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). 
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analyze whether a California’s burglary statute will have ACCA or 
IIRIRA consequences — which it clarified as being the categorical 
approach, divisibility step, and modified-categorical approach. As to 
the California statute at issue, the Court held it was overbroad and 
indivisible because California defined the element of entry as 
involving both lawful and unlawful entries and did not direct juries to 
agree on the actual method that occurred in that crime.21 Mr. 
Descamps was not subjected to ACCA’s sentencing enhancement, and 
any other person convicted of that crime would not be subjected to 
ACCA or IIRIRA’s collateral consequences. 
This area of the law had been mired with confusion, conflicting 
decisions, and ever-shifting doctrines. The Descamps majority 
decision, authored by Justice Kagan, announced that its three-step 
methodology was an obvious and natural extension of twenty-five 
years of precedent. Of note, in the divisibility step, the majority 
introduced the role of state law in interpreting statutes. In the above 
example, California jury instructions and case law would illuminate 
how a state defined the elements of the burglary offense.22 In the sole 
justice writing in dissent, Justice Alito, made a pointed criticism that 
the purpose of the Court was to “simplify the work of ACCA courts.” 
Justice Alito argued that Descamps’ new methodology was failing that 
end because parsing state law to figure out elements will be a difficult, 
technical rabbit hole.23 
After Descamps, a circuit split arose over whether the text of a 
statute or state law authority would be best used in gleaning whether 
the elements of a prior offense were or were not divisible.24 The 
majority of courts followed Justice Alito’s warning to avoid looking to 
 
 21 See id. at 2281-83. 
 22 See id. at 2284-85; see also Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
 23 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2301-02 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The only way to be sure 
whether particular items are alternative elements or simply alternative means of 
satisfying an element may be to find cases concerning the correctness of jury 
instructions that treat the items one way or the other. And such cases may not arise 
frequently. One of the Court’s reasons for adopting the modified categorical approach 
was to simplify the work of ACCA courts but the Court’s holding today will not serve 
that end.” (citation omitted)). 
 24 Compare United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir. 2015) (relying 
on text), rev’d, Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), United States v. Ozier, 
796 F.3d 597, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2015) (same), overruled in part by Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 
2243, and United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1055 (10th Cir. 2014) (same), 
overruled in part by Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 2243, with Rendon, 764 F.3d at 1088-89 (relying 
on state law), and Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 198-200 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(same). 
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state law, and only two — the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit — 
instead referred to state law — jury instructions, court decisions, and 
other statutes — to determine the meaning of the predicate crime. In 
2016, Mathis v. United States25 resolved the technical dispute in favor 
of relying on state law to determine divisibility. 
Part III focuses on two significant empirical aspects of the operation 
of Descamps and now Mathis. In weighing in on the Justice Kagan and 
Justice Alito debate, there is evidence to strongly suggest that Justice 
Kagan was likely correct in asserting that Descamps’ approach is more 
consistent and workable compared not just to pre-Descamps case law 
— but also to the textual approach recommended by Justice Alito’s 
dissent. In the pre-2013 landscape, courts often employed Justice 
Alito’s recommended methodology, gleaning a defendant’s conduct 
from court records.26 The result was ever-shifting doctrines, 
methodologies, and confusion. Compared to the pre-2013 cases, 
Descamps’ return to an elements-only approach introduced clarity that 
had been lacking. 
But more to the heart of Descamps, Part III compares the Eighth 
Circuit’s textual analysis (Justice Alito’s dissenting approach) with the 
Fourth Circuit’s state-law approach (Descamps’ majority approach). 
Looking at the published cases issued in the time period between 
Descamps and Mathis, there is a strong argument that the state-law 
approach is surprisingly workable. Among the fourteen Eighth Circuit 
decisions, one panel disagreed over whether the state statute could be 
interpreted by text or by a case that provided a different interpretation 
in context. Among the eleven published Fourth Circuit decisions, not 
a single judge disagreed with whether state law resolved the 
divisibility question. To the extent that consensus across political 
ideologies is evidence of consistency, this survey of cases suggests that 
Descamps in fact is providing more clarity and workability than its 
critics forewarned. 
But a more notable discovery from the different approaches is that 
the state-law approach — the one endorsed by Mathis — is scaling 
back collateral consequences of convictions in a much more 
pronounced way. When Descamps was properly applied in the circuits, 
 
 25 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
 26 See, e.g., Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075 (examining charging documents). In the 
Eighth Circuit decision underlying the Supreme Court Mathis decision, the Eighth 
Circuit erroneously relied on conduct at the modified categorical approach stage by 
relying on the information’s allegation of a garage to (erroneously) hold that the 
defendant was convicted of the subsection involving a building that met the generic 
burglary definition. See id.  
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there were noticeably fewer prior convictions that aligned with the 
generic offenses set forth in ACCA and IIRIRA.27 Stated another way, 
under Descamps and Mathis, there will be fewer statutes to which 
ACCA and IIRIRA consequences will attach. Federal judges have long 
voiced concern over the arbitrariness in ACCA and IIRIRA cases, 
colloquially described as one bad guy wrongfully getting off and 
another long-term resident being deported over a petty offense.28 I 
argue that the arbitrariness attributed to Descamps is in fact the fault of 
ACCA and IIRIRA and inherent to the very nature of collateral 
consequences. Whereas direct consequences of criminal law — 
conviction and sentence — metes out a tailored punishment to any 
given offender, ACCA and IIRIRA in particular are resulting in the 
absurdity of sweeping in minor and non-serious offenses. The greatest 
value of Descamps and Mathis is their ability to restore proportionality 
to ACCA and IIRIRA by eliminating their collateral consequences in 
their entirety. 
In Part IV, I contend that, as a normative matter, the actual result of 
reducing crime-based deportations is the correct one to reach. After 
Mathis and Descamps, in the ACCA context, prosecutors, judges, and 
policy makers are embracing the reduction and even elimination of 
collateral consequences. That is to be expected given that ACCA’s 
additional mandatory punishment is superfluous. Whatever the crime 
the defendant did when committing a federal firearm offense, the 
prosecutor and sentencing judge can assess the appropriate sentence. 
Avoiding a mandatory and lengthy sentencing enhancement for a past 
crime whose sentence was already served is neither unreasonable nor 
undesirable. In the Tough on Crime era, the additional penalty was 
believed to end recidivism. Mass incarceration has exposed this 
premise to be misguided and some contend that lengthy sentences are 
a leading contributor to recidivism. 
This Article suggests that that same result should be embraced in 
full in the immigration context. IIRIRA’s use of criminal convictions to 
sort out desirable from undesirable immigrants has failed. The use of a 
conviction does not distinguish who is dangerous from who is not. 
This existing system results in a man with a green card, who has a 
citizen wife and children and has been in the United States since his 
childhood, to be deported over stealing a $2 can of beer.29 Limiting the 
crimes to only violent ones also fails under this approach. Under 
 
 27 See infra notes 150–52.  
 28 See Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 29 See id. 
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IIRIRA’s definition, many individuals are included as violent offenders 
even though their offenses would not be viewed as such. For instance, 
until the Supreme Court corrected the issue, numerous individuals 
were deported because the federal courts wrongfully found their DUI 
convictions to be violent crimes.30 Likewise, a teenager who spat at a 
police officer during an arrest has been found to commit a crime of 
violence, even though few would deem that conduct serious, 
dangerous, or worthy of lost immigration status.31 
It is time then to reconsider and repeal IIRIRA and its emphasis on 
deporting individuals based on convictions alone. I am far from alone 
in calling for such reform. A number of immigration scholars have 
been arguing for this result out of principles of proportionality, 
fairness, and human rights norms.32 Likewise, criminal law scholars 
are engaged in an invigorating project to question the reason for — 
and unintended costs of — collateral consequences.33 This article 
 
 30 See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (reversing Eleventh Circuit decision 
holding that a DUI offense under Florida law that punished negligent conduct was not 
a crime of violence and not an aggravated felony under the INA). 
 31 See infra notes 53–54, 185–86, 221–49 and accompanying text. 
 32 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Symposium, Doubling Down on Racial 
Discrimination: The Racially Disparate Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 993, 1029-37 (2016) [hereinafter Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination] 
(arguing that greater attention should be paid to the racial consequences of the linking 
of the criminal justice and immigration removal systems, and recommending reforms 
to U.S. immigration law due to the “racially disparate impacts” of the criminal justice 
system); Daniel Kanstroom, Smart(er) Enforcement: Rethinking Removal, Structuring 
Proportionality, and Imagining Graduated Sanctions, 30 J.L. & POL. 465, 487 (2015) 
(“Most fundamentally, one might first ask why we deport long-term legal residents 
who commit crimes, instead of simply punishing them in the criminal justice system 
as we do citizens.”); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the 
Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 262 (2012) (arguing for a more robust version of the categorical 
approach to “correct[] for the absence of procedural and substantive rights for the 
noncitizen”); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric 
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 475-81 (2007) 
(criticizing IIRIRA’s expanded immigration grounds that are based on criminal 
offenses and advocating for a more “civil regulatory model”); Rebecca Sharpless, Clear 
and Simple Deportation Rules for Crimes: Why We Need Them and Why It’s Hard to Get 
Them, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 933, 935-36 (2015) (arguing to “repeal the current crime-
based grounds of removal and create a new ground based on a trigger of over five 
years actual incarceration for a crime”).  
 33 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 139-41 (2010) (making a forceful argument about the myriad 
ways by which collateral consequences lead to disenfranchisement); Gabriel J. Chin, 
Symposium, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Incarceration, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790-93, 1831 (2012) (arguing for such 
reforms as discretionary instead of mandatory impositions); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting 
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contributes to the existing conversations by embracing the practical 
realities that are happening in the federal courts and voicing a 
normative defense of that result. 
In the current political climate, defending non-citizens who commit 
crimes as valuable members of our country is not popular. But as a 
matter of history, it is IIRIRA’s radical reconfiguration for a great 
number of convictions to result in deportation that is the aberration. 
For 100 years, criminal aliens were only seven percent of all 
deportations. In 1996, IIRIRA expanded the types of crimes that could 
kick someone out of the country from the most serious felonies to 
minor crimes, including drug possession, misdemeanors, and even 
those that are expunged and pardoned. Now, six out of every ten 
deportations are for crimes, at a tangible cost in billions of dollars in 
heightened enforcement. 
But not everyone who breaks the criminal law is a hardened 
recidivist or even dangerous. Some have served in our military, have 
children and spouses who are citizens, have lengthy employment 
histories, have been paying taxes, and are good neighbors. Some 
commit crimes that in fact involve non-serious conduct. Criminal 
judges who knew the facts of a case used to be able to stop deporting 
someone whose crime arose from stupidity rather than depravity. 
Moreover, these crime-based deportation grounds apply retroactively, 
meaning individuals who pose no risk of any criminal activity are 
newly subjected to deportation based on a crime they committed — 
and reformed from — decades ago. Immigration judges too used to 
have power to weigh the good and the bad and give a second chance to 
individuals who exhibited remorse, rehabilitation, and contributions 
to the community. IIRIRA simply ended giving anyone a second 
chance. As illustrated in the cases described above, kicking these 
people out, and disrupting their families, over drug possession and 
minor offenses is harsh and absurd. 
This article was written before the election of Donald Trump. It has 
taken on new meaning in light of the Trump administration’s 
heightened commitment to increasing crime-based deportations. In 
light of this shift in immigration enforcement priorities, it is critical to 
ask why are crimes used as a means to deport people? As argued here, 
the main problem is that the current use of categories to identify 
which crimes will have immigration consequences is incredibly 
 
Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1210-15 (2016) (discussing prosecutorial 
decisions to impose or avoid the collateral consequences when entering plea 
bargains). 
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overinclusive. A deportable offense includes misdemeanors;34 a violent 
crime includes spitting at a police officer during an arrest.35 The 
Trump administration is taking the absurdity found in existing law 
and making it ridiculous. The new policies do not fix the overinclusive 
problem. To the contrary, someone is now a priority for deportation if 
they have been arrested or engaged in conduct that could be a crime.36 
Instead of sorting out immigrants based on how they entered or 
penalizing them for minor crimes, immigration law needs to sort out 
contributing from non-contributing immigrants. Criminal convictions 
are neither effective nor efficient in drawing these lines. After Mathis, 
the federal courts will be significantly reducing collateral 
consequences on a case-by-case, statute-by-statute basis. The federal 
courts will reach this result out of the technical dissection of 
individual criminal statutes. This Article argues that this practical 
result is the better way to avoid the absurd and arbitrary results that 
otherwise attach when criminal convictions are considered relevant to 
the questions of who can stay and who can remain in this country. 
Those who pay taxes, have citizen children, serve in the military, work 
in jobs citizens will not take, or help those around them, need a path 
to legalization. And those who cause more harm than good should be 
deported. Criminal convictions can no longer be the only factor in this 
consideration. A full repeal of IIRIRA and a defense of non-citizens 
who commit crimes is in order. 
I. OVERVIEW OF ACCA AND IRIRRA’S FRAMEWORKS AND JUDICIAL 
DETERMINATIONS OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
As much as ACCA and IIRIRA involve two very different contexts 
— heightened sentences for firearm felons with past crimes and 
removal (technical term for deportation) for non-citizens who are 
convicted of crimes — both laws attach consequences for prior 
criminal convictions. For ACCA, certain prior offenses trigger longer 
sentences for the federal firearm offense. For IIRIRA, certain prior 
offenses trigger deportation, and at times, potentially permanent exile. 
Despite the different contexts, the federal courts rely on the same 
 
 34 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 570-71 (2010) (involving 
misdemeanor offense for possession of one Xanax tablet). 
 35 See United States v. Carthone, 726 F.3d 503, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming 
on procedural grounds the district court’s treatment of defendant’s prior conviction, 
arising from defendant having spat on a police officer, as a “crime of violence”). 
 36 See Memorandum on Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the 
National Interest from John Kelly, supra note 5, at 2. 
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doctrine and same methodology to determine if a prior offense is a 
predicate offense.37 As set forth below, the 2013 Descamps decision 
and 2016 Mathis decision significantly changed how and when these 
consequences are determined. 
A. Statutory Framework: How ACCA and IIRIRA Attach Consequences 
to Prior Criminal Convictions 
In 1984, when the United States wanted an aggressive response to 
recidivism, Congress enacted ACCA. Borne out of the finding that a 
“large percentage” of crimes of theft and violence “are committed by a 
very small percentage of repeat offenders,”38 ACCA “was intended to 
supplement the States’ law enforcement efforts against ‘career’ 
criminals.”39 
ACCA then imposed a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence on 
specific individuals who possessed and received firearms in commerce 
after having had three prior convictions that were considered violent 
felonies, serious drug offenses, or both.40 The prior convictions could 
have arisen in state or federal court, at any point in time, and included 
juvenile adjudications.41 As will be discussed below, although the 
 
 37 Prior to 2013, many Courts applied the case law interchangeably. As recognized 
by the BIA, “Descamps itself makes no distinction between the criminal and 
immigration contexts and the circuit courts have held that the approach to statutory 
divisibility announced there applies in removal proceedings in the same manner as in 
criminal sentencing proceedings.” In re Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 349, 354 
(2014), vacated in part on other grounds, 26 I. & N. Dec. 478, 478 (2015).  
 38 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990) (quoting and citing to the 
legislative history found at H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1, 3 (1984) and S. REP. NO. 98-
190, at 5 (1983)).  
 39 Id. Critics have raised concerns about ACCA’s lack of maximum sentence, its 
inclusion of juvenile crimes, its failure to account for the remoteness of the crimes, 
and the seeming arbitrariness that arises from absurd consequences attaching to minor 
crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 801 F.2d 754, 755 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e 
uphold the constitutionality of the Act against the charge that, because it fixes a 
minimum but not a maximum sentence, it denies due process . . . .”); Ethan Davis, 
Comment, The Sentence Imposed Versus the Statutory Maximum: Repairing the Armed 
Career Criminal Act, 118 YALE L.J. 369, 370-71 (2008) (arguing for a series of reforms 
to ACCA out of concern that minor offenses are swept in); James G. Levine, Note, The 
Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward 
Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 540 (2009) (arguing against ACCA’s inclusion 
of crimes that are remote, juvenile offenses, or part of the same information). 
 40 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (listing 
certain persons for whom it is illegal to ship or transport firearms or ammunition in 
interstate or foreign commerce). 
 41 See Jenny W.L. Osborne, One Day Criminal Careers: The Armed Career Criminal 
Act’s Different Occasions Provision, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 963, 966-94 (2011) 
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selected categories of crimes appeared to narrow the prior offenses to 
serious matters, in practice, ACCA swept in convictions whose 
underlying conduct did not involve violence and swept in drug 
offenses that involved possession and were not punished with prison 
terms by the state courts.42 ACCA’s targeting of drug offenses as 
serious crimes arose from an assumption that drug use involved or led 
to violence. Whether it be from the empathy afforded those currently 
afflicted with the opioid addiction or the racial difference from the 
perceived drug user of today (white) from one from the 1980s and 
1990s (black), there is a growing disaggregation from the assumption 
that drug addiction is a gateway to crime instead of a social harm that 
needs treatment. But at the time of ACCA’s enactment, the notion that 
drug use leads to violent crime was entrenched in the public 
imagination.43 
 
(discussing “ACCA’s overinclusive and arbitrary application” and summarizing reform 
proposals). 
 42 David M. Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy: Learning Lessons 
from Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines Era, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 53 
(2008) (“Thus, petty offenders, especially drug addicts desperate for a ‘fix,’ could 
easily amass the requisite three convictions to qualify for the fifteen-year mandatory, 
simply by selling small amounts of drugs or breaking into a store at night. As a result, 
some of these alleged ‘career criminals’ had never been to state prison for their crimes, 
having received either probation or short stints in county facilities.”). 
 43 Although a number of studies do establish a correlation, if not causation, between 
drug abuse and crime, violent crimes arising from alcohol use — a legal substance — are 
perpetuated at similar rates. See generally United States v. Carter, 750 F.3d 462, 467-70 
(4th Cir. 2014) (after citing recent studies: “[w]e have little trouble concluding that the 
studies presented to the district court by both the government and Carter indicate a strong 
link between drug use and violence”). In Carter, the Court cited a 2004 study recording 
“that almost 50% of all state and federal prisoners who had committed violent felonies 
were drug abusers or addicts in the year before their arrest, as compared to only 2% of the 
general population.” Id. at 467. According to the National Council on Alcoholism, 
“Alcohol is a factor in 40% of all violent crimes today, and according to the Department of 
Justice, 37% of almost 2 million convicted offenders currently in jail, report that they were 
drinking at the time of their arrest.” Alcohol, Drugs and Crimes, NAT’L COUNCIL ON 
ALCOHOLISM & DRUG DEPENDENCE, https://www.ncadd.org/about-addiction/alcohol-drugs-
and-crime (last updated June 27, 2015, 2:32 PM). By contrast, in contemporary times, 
those currently afflicted with the opioid addiction are not presumed to be violent and are 
given treatment. See C.J. Arlotta, Obama Signs Opioid Legislation, Despite Funding Concerns, 
FORBES (Jul. 23, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cjarlotta/2016/07/23/obama-signs-
opioid-legislation-despite-funding-concerns; Katharine Q. Seelye, Massachusetts Chief’s 
Tack in Drug War Steer Addicts to Rehab, Not Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/25/us/massachusetts-chiefs-tack-in-drug-war-steer-
addicts-to-rehab-not-jail.html; Ekow N. Yankah, Opinion, When Addiction Has a White 
Face, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/opinion/when-
addiction-has-a-white-face.html (“It is hard to describe the bittersweet sting that many 
African-Americans feel witnessing this national embrace of addicts. It is heartening to see 
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In 1996, Congress overhauled immigration enforcement by amending 
the Immigration Nationality Act (“INA”) with IIRIRA. The INA, enacted 
in 1952, is embraced as the framework for modern immigration 
regulation.44 The INA identified a limited number of crimes that were 
grounds of exclusion (applied to those outside of the country) and 
deportation (applied to those inside the country). At the time, the type 
of conviction that would result in deportation was a crime involving 
moral turpitude, an elusive term but one intending to reach debased 
and depraved criminality.45 As the Courts struggled to define the scope, 
these crimes generally involved theft (where deceit occurred), violence 
(but more than mere assault), and certain sex offenses. In 1952, 
Congress further limited these offenses by requiring that they have 
either a specific length of sentence, occur more than once, or occur 
within five years of a non-citizen’s entry into the United States.46 
Before IIRIRA, a criminal conviction was the start, not the end, of the 
inquiry as to whether a lawful permanent resident could remain in the 
country. Since 1917, Congress permitted criminal courts to grant 
Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation (“JRAD”), which were 
binding stops on deportation to which immigration courts deferred.47 
Even for criminal convictions that were without JRADs, in immigration 
courts, if non-citizens established strong ties to residents and citizens of 
 
the eclipse of the generations-long failed war on drugs. But black Americans are also 
knowingly weary and embittered by the absence of such enlightened thinking when those 
in our own families were similarly wounded. When the face of addiction had dark skin, 
this nation’s police did not see sons and daughters, sister and brothers. They saw ‘brothas,’ 
young thugs to be locked up, rather than ‘people with a purpose in life.’”). 
 44 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 45 See Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring) 
(“Congress has never defined ‘moral turpitude,’ but courts and the immigration 
agencies have tended to adopt a slight variant of the definition in Black’s Law 
Dictionary: an ‘act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties 
which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general. . . . [An] act or behavior 
that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of [the] community 
and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offenses as 
distinguished from others.’”). Judge Posner, among others, have been critical of the 
vagueness of this definition: “It’s difficult to make sense of these definitions, which 
approach gibberish yet are quoted deferentially in countless modern opinions.” See id.  
 46 Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness, 
90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 651 (2012) (“The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
which completely revised the immigration laws, contained the same [crime involving 
moral turpitude (“CIMT”)] provisions of the 1917 act, rendering a noncitizen 
inadmissible for a CIMT and deportable for two CIMTs, or a single CIMT committed 
within five years of admission if a sentence of one year or longer was imposed.”). 
 47 See Jason A. Cade, Return of the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 36, 38 (2015).  
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this country — equities such as military service, lengthy employment, 
and community service, and rehabilitation — immigration judges had 
the discretion to provide non-citizen with a second chance to remain in 
the United States.48 These remedies were conditioned on being granted 
once, and only once, to prevent recidivists from remaining. Because 
many remedies remained available to those with criminal convictions, 
practitioners usually did not expend resources on contesting whether a 
crime fit the immigration charge. Indeed, crime-based deportation was 
small part of immigration enforcement, accounting for seven percent of 
all deportations from 1908 to 1986.49 
IIRIRA changed this scheme in a dramatic manner. Among its 
numerous provisions, IIRIRA expanded the number and category of 
crimes that constitute aggravated felonies. An aggravated felony, with 
only narrow exceptions, usually results in the deportation and 
permanent exile of a non-citizen from the country.50 The term 
 
 48 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 n.5 (2001) (permitting section 212(c) to 
remain available for certain individuals). For lawful permanent residents, Congress 
permitted Section 212(c) as a remedy for LPRs whose equities outweighed the debits. 
Section 212(c) referred to the code in the INA that was a remedy for LPRs who had 
committed crimes. As noted in St. Cyr, Section 212(c) cases were granted at a national 
rate of at least 51.5%. See id.; infra notes 219–49 and accompanying text. For non-
citizens who were first seeking to be lawful permanent residents, they could apply for 
suspension of deportation, which barred the remedy for those who had assisted the 
Nazi government persecute others. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.65 (2017) (enumerating 
eligibility for suspension of deportation under former section 244(a)(1) of the INA, 
which ceased to be in effect on April 1, 1997). In 1952, the crimes that categorically 
barred this remedy were those that would prevent someone from being found to be a 
person of good moral character or having an actual period of confinement in a penal 
institution for more than 180 days pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1994). The 
provision was updated in 1997 to bar eligibility for those who committed aggravated 
felonies and drug crimes.  
 49 Legomsky, supra note 32, at 488 n.92 (“From 1908 through 1986 there were 
large fluctuations, but, for that era as a whole, approximately 7% of all deportations 
were on crime-related post-entry grounds.”). 
 50 Most aggravated felonies bar certain relief such as asylum, cancellation, and 
citizenship, regardless of whether the ground was used to commence removal 
proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (asylum); § 1229a(a)(3) (2012) 
(cancellation for lawful permanent residents); § 1229a(b)(1)(C) (2012) (cancellation 
for non-lawful permanent residents); § 316(d) (2012) (lack of good moral character 
bar to citizenship); § 1101(f)(8) (2012) (aggravated felony is bar to good moral 
character). For those who fear returning to their native country, an aggravated felony 
would not preclude the grant of protection under the Convention Against Torture. See 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B) (2012) (aggravated felony bar to withholding of removal only if 
accompanied by 5 year prison sentence); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (2016) (withholding of 
removal under CAT); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17 (2016) (deferral of removal under CAT). 
Certain exceptions also arise if the aggravated felony is not related to drugs and the 
person is eligible to re-adjust status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (waiver available 
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“aggravated felony” is a misnomer because it implies that the offense is 
the worst of the worst. Congress first created the term aggravated felony 
in 1988, which it limited to murder, drug trafficking crimes, illicit 
trafficking in firearms, and illicit trafficking in explosives.51 In 1990, 
Congress expanded the definition to notably include particular violent 
crimes if an imposed sentence was five years or more, and more drug 
offenses.52 In 1996, Congress passed IIRIRA and expanded the nature 
and number of crimes that constitute aggravated felonies to 
approximately twenty-one categories of crimes.53 The current definition 
includes non-violent drug offenses, misdemeanors, minor offenses, 
offenses for which sentences were suspended in their entirety, and 
convictions that were vacated and expunged under state and federal 
law.54 Stated another way, an “aggravated felony” now no longer needs 
apply to a crime that was either aggravated or even a felony. 
In addition to aggravated felonies, inadmissibility grounds (applied 
to non-citizens who are first requesting lawful status, regardless of 
whether they are at the border or in the country) and deportability 
grounds (applied to people in lawful status in the country) regulate 
who can enter and remain in the country.55 Katherine Brady developed 
the analogy of a dinner party to explain the difference between these 
terms.56 When having a dinner party, invited guests must engage in 
somewhat serious conduct to be ejected. Not using a napkin, for 
instance, may keep a host from extending an initial invitation to 
 
to crimes not involving drug offenses); see also § 1101(a)(15)(T) & (U) (aggravated 
felony not a bar to T and U visas, available to those who cooperate with law 
enforcement authorities under certain conditions). 
 51 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469. 
 52 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 602, 104 Stat. 4978. 
 53 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1996). 
 54 See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text (discussing how IIRIRA captures 
misdemeanors, minor offenses, and expunged convictions); infra note 222–32 
accompanying text (discussing how IIRIRA is retroactive). Many individuals who were 
convicted and served their sentences years ago, are newly vulnerable to removal even 
though the offense did not have serious, or even any, immigration consequences at the 
date of the conviction. For a discussion of how citizens are being wrongfully removed 
under this scheme, see Kari E. Hong, Removing Citizens: Parenthood, Immigration 
Courts, and Derivative Citizenship, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 278, 310-15 (2014). 
 55 Deportability grounds attach to individuals who have been admitted into the 
United States. Although the term “admission” is a term of art that has different 
meanings in different federal circuits, a lawful permanent resident and tourist both are 
examples of individuals who have been admitted into the country and thus subjected 
to deportability grounds. See 8 U.S.C §1101(a)(13) (2016).  
 56 1 KATHERINE A. BRADY ET AL., IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., DEFENDING 
IMMIGRANTS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 1-12 to 1-13 (10th ed. 2008). 
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dinner. But once at the table, most hosts would let someone stay until 
they engaged in disruptive or offensive conduct such as intentionally 
insulting the host or harming another guest.57 In keeping with this 
analogy, Congress developed deportability grounds to identify what 
bad conduct non-citizens with lawful status — such as lawful 
permanent residents, students, or tourists — would have to engage in 
to result in their deportation. Although some grounds include conduct 
(such as falsely claiming to be a citizen), the grounds relating to crime 
require an actual conviction, and as a whole, are fewer in number than 
the inadmissibility grounds. 
Returning to the dinner party analogy, for strangers who have not 
yet been invited to a party, the reasons for keeping them out would 
involve less serious conduct and would be greater in number. Just as 
not using a napkin could offend a host enough to decide against 
inviting someone to dinner, the inadmissibility grounds include minor 
and even unintentional violations such as students working too many 
hours or in campus jobs not previously approved for compensation.58 
Likewise, inadmissibility grounds subject non-citizens — such as non-
citizens who are married to citizens or hired by U.S. companies and 
are first requesting admission to the country — to exclusions for less 
serious reasons. In contrast to the deportability grounds, 
inadmissibility grounds arise based on criminal activity — even in the 
absence of a conviction or arrest — and a wider range of misconduct 
(for instance, having a likelihood of being a public charge or 
abandoning citizenship to avoid paying taxes). 
Whether it be predicate ACCA offenses, aggravated felonies, 
deportability grounds, or inadmissibility grounds, all are subject to the 
same methodology when determining if specific convictions (or 
criminal conduct) will trigger collateral consequences in federal 
criminal court (ACCA) or federal immigration court (IIRIRA). 
B. ACCA and IIRIRA Consequences Are Collateral Ones that Can Be 
Disaggregated from Prior Crimes 
Despite their seeming disparate contexts, ACCA and IIRIRA share a 
common purpose and methodology that impose severe consequences 
based on prior crimes that occurred in state or federal court. Known as 
collateral consequences, the precise definition of that term is in order. 
 
 57 See text accompanying notes 15–18 and 217–27. 
 58 See Can You Work Part Time With A U.S. Student Visa, TOPUNIVERSITIES (Dec. 9, 
2015) https://www.topuniversities.com/student-info/studying-abroad/can-you-work-
part-time-us-student-visa. 
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The American Bar Association defines a direct consequence as a 
punishment, condition, or restriction being imposed by a sentencing 
court within its authority as contemplated by a legislature.59 A 
collateral consequence, by contrast, is a penalty, disability, or 
disadvantage that is imposed by a different authority in a different 
context arising from a prior conviction.60 
Scholars and courts have noted that these definitions are much more 
nebulous than the ABA suggests. Even though a direct consequence 
would be a conviction and punishment that ends upon release from 
prison, as a general matter, the societal costs from a conviction include 
stigma and opprobrium that attach to the person who committed the 
crime and even to their family members.61 Unlike a pure direct 
consequence, the stigma extends to multiple contexts, and in many 
ways is more difficult to erase because it does not end when someone 
is released from prison. 
In the immigration context, what is and is not a collateral 
consequence is also arguably blurred. In Padilla v. Kentucky, the 
Supreme Court pointedly observed that deportation as resulting from 
criminal convictions is “uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct 
or a collateral consequence” because “of its close connection to the 
criminal process.”62 There is much scholarship on how post-Padilla, 
the line between criminality and immigration violations has collapsed, 
and perhaps even should continue to collapse.63 
 
 59 See AM. BAR ASSOC., COLLATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 12. 
 60 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 61 See Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 623, 623-90 (2006) (providing a thorough discussion on collateral 
consequences, barriers to reentry, and state and local programs seeking to offset those 
factors in the interest of reducing recidivism); id. at 623 n.1 (citing to Mirjan R. 
Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A Comparative 
Study, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347, 347 (1968)) (defining the social 
consequences of criminal convictions such as ostracism or denial of employment); id. 
(citing to George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the 
Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1897 (1999)) (discussing the stigma 
that attaches to convicted felons); Dina R. Rose & Todd R. Clear, Incarceration, 
Reentry and Social Capital: Social Networks in the Balance, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED 
313, 326-34 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003) (discussing social reentry 
problems including problems with finances, identity, and relationships with others). 
 62 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010). I wish to thank Ingrid Eagly and 
Eisha Jain for emphasizing the importance of this ambiguity when considering 
collateral consequences. 
 63 The seminal piece discussing the collapse is Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. 
Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002), noting “[t]he idea that collateral consequences are 
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In respectful disagreement to these thoughtful arguments, I accept 
the premise that ACCA and IIRIRA comport with the ABA’s definition 
of collateral consequences. In 1988 and 1996, Congress made express 
decisions to impose additional ACCA and IIRIRA penalties at a future 
time in a separate context (federal court and immigration court) than 
the forum where the original conviction was adjudicated. These 
consequences were never part of the initial criminal conviction and 
were never imposed (or known) by the court that sentenced the 
defendant. Given that IIRIRA imposed retroactive application to 
criminal convictions, for many sentencing courts and criminal 
defendants, it was impossible to have known that even a conviction 
that had no immigration consequences at the time of sentencing 
would some day in the future be classified as an aggravated felony 
compelling deportation.64 Returning to the JRAD example, starting in 
1917, Congress authorized criminal court judges to make a binding 
recommendation against deportation (known as “JRADs”) if they 
believed mitigating circumstances in those crimes or in offenders 
existed.65 In 1990, Congress repealed the JRAD.66 Since 1990 then, 
deportation then has very much met the definition of a collateral 
consequence — an additional penalty imposed by a different court for 
punishment for a crime adjudicated previously. 
As a normative matter, drawing clear distinctions between future 
consequences and prior convictions is an important reminder that 
they do not need to be combined. Stated another way, disaggregating 
IIRIRA consequences from the original triggering criminal conviction 
underscores the reality that immigration policy is not necessarily 
related to the goals of criminal justice. In 1996, Congress made 
express policy decisions to impose and expand additional immigration 
 
divorced from the criminal process has never really been true . . . .” Post Padilla, 
others have robustly discussed the dimensions of how immigration law is uniquely 
tied to criminal grounds. See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the 
Evolving Right to Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress?, 45 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 305, 307 (2011) (“[I]t remains clear that the constitutional norms applicable to 
criminal cases should inform our approach to deportation far more specifically than 
they have in the past.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 64 See Tyson v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2012) (a 53-year-old LPR was 
charged with committing an aggravated felony based on a crime that had occurred in 
her twenties. At the time of the conviction, it had no immigration consequences.) 
 65 See Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 
889-90. 
 66 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 
(“Elimination of Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation”). 
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penalties where none previously existed.67 At the time, recidivism was 
feared as a social ill that was due to the character of the criminal. After 
the United States has incarcerated over 20% of the world’s inmates 
(while producing 5% of its population), and spends eighty billion 
dollars a year on a prison system that has a 77% recidivism rate, mass 
incarceration is seen as its own social problem that is generating more 
problems than any incarceration is in fact solving.68 
As explained below, ACCA is more readily reaching the conclusion 
that increased sentencing enhancements for punishing prior crimes is 
not necessary. My argument in this Article is that only once 
immigration and crime are accepted as separate concepts, can 
normative questions be posed regarding why, how, and whether 
criminal convictions should continue to be a part of immigration 
policy. In Parts II and III, I explain why crimes should be reduced as 
proxies for determining who can and cannot remain in this country. 
Before that can be explored in depth, understanding the judicial 
framework of how consequences attach to IIRIRA and ACCA is 
necessary. 
C. Legal Framework Prior to 2013: The Taylor/Shepard/Nijhawan 
Framework Was Haphazardly Applied 
Even though federal firearm offenses and federal immigration 
violations do not appear to share common features, the federal courts 
employ the same methodology and same court decisions when 
determining whether specific prior offenses have consequences under 
ACCA and IIRIRA.69 In June 2016, the Supreme Court announced that 
 
 67 Supra note 15; see Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546.  
 68 National Statistics of Recidivism, NAT’L INST. JUST., http://www.nij.gov/topics/ 
corrections/recidivism/pages/welcome.aspx (last updated June 17, 2014); see Alana Semuel, 
What Incarceration Costs American Families, ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2015), http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/the-true-costs-of-mass-incarceration/ 
405412/ (describing the ongoing financial burdens faced by families of those who have 
been incarcerated). 
 69 See, e.g., In re Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 819, 819-20 (B.I.A. 2016) 
(“[W]e now clarify that the understanding of statutory ‘divisibility’ embodied in 
Descamps and Mathis applies in immigration proceedings nationwide to the same 
extent that it applies in criminal sentencing proceedings.”). A notable exception is the 
crime of violence definition because IIRIRA and ACCA have slightly different 
statutory definitions of violence, which at times requires the different forum to 
distinguish precedent from applying. See Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th 
Cir. 2015) (“The INA provides for the removal of non-citizens who have been 
‘convicted of an aggravated felony.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Its definition of an 
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“[f]or more than 25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that 
application of ACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements 
[of the predicate offenses to the generic definitions of crimes that 
warrant enhanced sentences].”70 This is true for both ACCA and the 
INA.71 Of the facts underlying a given crime, “ACCA (so we have held, 
over and over) does not care.”72 This is how Mathis described its 
decisions, and the lower courts’ application of them. Despite Mathis’ 
decisiveness, over the past twenty-five years, federal courts have been 
employing confusing, conflicting, and haphazard approaches to ACCA 
and IIRIRA. As set forth below, the proceeding sections provide an 
overview of how the law operated before the 2013 Descamps decision, 
the circuit splits after the Descamps decision, and the resolution 
reached in the 2016 Mathis decision. 
Beginning in 1990, Taylor v. United States set forth what is known as 
the categorical approach and modified-categorical approach in 
assessing consequences of prior crimes.73 The issue presented in 
Taylor was that Congress had provided for a fifteen-year mandatory 
minimum sentence for burglary offenses without providing any 
definition as to what crimes were and were not predicate burglaries.74 
 
aggravated felony includes numerous offenses, including ‘a crime of violence (as 
defined in section 16 of Title 18 . . . ).’”), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016). 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F). The subsection of 18 U.S.C. § 16 that the BIA relied on in this case 
defines a crime of violence as an “offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another 
may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012). Had 
Congress written out the relevant definition in full instead of relying on cross-
referencing, a lawful permanent resident would be removable if “convicted of an 
offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical 
force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing 
the offense” (emphasis added). The language in ACCA that Johnson held 
unconstitutional is similar. The ACCA provision defined a “violent felony” as “any 
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year [i.e., a felony] . . . 
that . . . involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (emphasis added). Importantly, both the 
provision at issue here and ACCA’s residual clause are subject to the same mode of 
analysis.” 
 70 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016). 
 71 In discussing the determination of crimes defined by ACCA and IIRIRA, “[b]oth 
are subject to the categorical approach, which demands that courts ‘look to the 
elements and the nature of the offense of conviction, rather than to the particular facts 
relating to petitioner’s crime.’” Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 
2015) (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004)), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 31 
(2016).  
 72 Id. 
 73 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 575 & 602 (1990). 
 74 Id. at 581-82 (defining the “problem presented in this case” as arising when 
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In defining which state and federal crimes met the generic burglary 
term in ACCA, the Supreme Court settled on the categorical approach 
— a comparison of the elements of a state or federal offense to the 
generic definition of a crime. Relying simply on the statute’s name for 
an offense was not an adequate option given that some states did not 
even use term “burglary,” opting to call the same conduct “breaking 
and entering.”75 Taylor then formulated the categorical approach 
whereby the elements of a predicate statute would be compared with a 
generic definition of the offense (if not defined in the statute, 
developed by the courts).76 
The advantages of using elements of an offense instead of 
determining what any given defendant did, as explained in 1990, was 
that the ACCA definition would sweep in a “range of predicate 
offenses” that had “certain common characteristics.”77 The sweep 
would reach certain offenses that had indicia of dangerousness that 
Congress believed were accurate predictors of who would go on to 
commit more serious offenses against people.78 But also, relying on 
elements was a check on fairness. Tasking a court with the discovery 
of the defendant’s conduct underlying the prior offense is mired with 
“practical difficulties and potential unfairness.”79 As a matter of 
fairness, most criminal records contain little information beyond a 
charge and fact of conviction. Attaching consequences on conduct 
then would penalize those whose states or courts had the facts in the 
record while letting others — who may have engaged in more serious 
conduct — without penalty based on discrepancies in record keeping. 
Even of greater concern, by definition, a plea agreement dispatches of 
the need to find out what in fact happened. For many defendants, they 
had no incentive to contest allegations of what drug (or level of 
violence or type of taking or any other number of elements that carry 
significance in ACCA and IIRIRA) was involved in an initial crime 
when the penalty for the substance (or contact or taking) was the 
same. It then becomes unfair to require these individuals to conduct a 
 
Congress expanded ACCA’s predicate offenses “from ‘robbery or burglary’ to ‘a violent 
felony or a serious drug offense’; it defined the term ‘violent felony’ to include 
‘burglary’; and it deleted the pre-existing definition of burglary”). 
 75 Id. at 591 (citing to Michigan’s criminal code that does not use the term 
“burglary”). 
 76 Id. at 599. The decision had concurring opinions but no dissenting ones. See id. 
at 602. 
 77 Id. at 588. 
 78 See id. 
 79 Id. at 601. 
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trial in immigration court or federal court years later to newly dispute 
allegations that were not proven or of significance in the criminal 
proceeding. While how a crime occurred was relevant, Taylor mused 
on the absurdity of having a prosecutor engage in a trial that never 
happened below to determine how and why a defendant was 
convicted. By comparison, the elements-based test seemed 
straightforward. 
The modified-categorical step was the next in line for the Court to 
define. Starting in Taylor, the Supreme Court noted that the 
categorical approach would not resolve whether all prior crimes 
triggered enhancements. In what it predicted would be a “narrow 
range of cases,” an ACCA court would need to look at specific parts of 
the criminal records to determine — not whether a defendant engaged 
in prior conduct — but whether “a jury was actually required to find 
all the elements of [the] generic burglary [offense]” when convicting 
the defendant of the predicate crime.80 
Taylor used the example of a state burglary statute criminalizing in 
separate elements entry of both cars and buildings — the former is 
overbroad to the generic definition and the latter is a match. In such 
example, Taylor directed a sentencing court to examine the prior 
offense’s statutory definition, charging documents, and jury 
instructions to determine if the defendant was charged and convicted 
of the element involving entry into a building, which would trigger 
ACCA consequences.81 
In 2005, Shepard v. United States82 further added the plea agreement, 
transcript of the plea colloquy, or other comparable judicial record as 
documents that may also be examined when determining if a 
conviction matched the generic offense.83 The Government had 
requested police reports to be included on this list, arguing that absent 
a means to examine specific crimes, ACCA (and by then IIRIRA) 
consequences will attach based on the “idiosyncrasies of record-
keeping in any particular State.”84 The Supreme Court rejected this 
concern, explaining that having a collateral mini-trial would be a 
much greater evil.85 Although not express, both the Government and 
 
 80 Id. at 602. 
 81 See id. 
 82 544 U.S. 13 (2005). 
 83 Id. at 26. 
 84 Id. at 22. 
 85 Id. at 24 (“The Court thus anticipated [in, inter alia, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000)] the very rule later imposed for the sake of preserving the Sixth 
Amendment right, that any fact other than a prior conviction sufficient to raise the 
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Supreme Court acknowledged the inherent arbitrariness in relying on 
past convictions as relevant in future proceedings. 
In 2009, in Nijhawan v. Holder,86 a unanimous Supreme Court87 
threw a slight curve ball, by making a limited modification to the 
categorical approach. Recognizing that immigration grounds 
sometimes defined crimes with specific attendant circumstances, the 
Supreme Court announced that only in these circumstances may an 
immigration court broaden its examination of the judicial record.88 
For example, although there are numerous state and federal crimes 
defining a theft crime that matches the aggravated felony defined as a 
“theft offense,”89 there are fewer than a dozen state and federal crimes 
that could fit into the specific aggravated felony defined as “fraud or 
deceit in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000.”90 
When applying these “circumstance-specific” grounds, the Supreme 
Court permitted a reviewing court to look at documents beyond the 
Shepard documents.91 If the documents were “fundamentally fair” and 
the defendant had had a meaningful “opportunity” to contest any 
finding set forth in them, a reviewing court could expand its search to 
determine if a defendant’s conduct matched the grounds.92 Since 
 
limit of the possible federal sentence must be found by a jury, in the absence of any 
waiver of rights by the defendant.”). The questions over how Taylor squares with 
Apprendi arose again in the concurring and dissenting opinions in Mathis. See Mathis 
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2258-71 (2016). For an excellent discussion of this 
issue, see Rebecca Sharpless, Finally a True Elements Test: Mathis v. U.S. and the 
Categorical Approach (Univ. of Miami Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 16-34, 2017), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2820398. 
 86 Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009). 
 87 Elena Kagan was the Solicitor General arguing the Nijhawan case. Id. at 31. 
 88 Id. at 38 (when discussing the INA’s general versus circumstance-specific 
subsections, observing that the INA “has other provisions that contain qualifying 
language that certainly seems to call for circumstance-specific application”). 
 89 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012). 
 90 See 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i); Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 39-40 (in developing 
the circumstance-specific approach, the Court observed that there was no federal 
fraud statute with the specific amount of $10,000 mentioned; in addition, when 
IIRIRA was enacted, 29 states had no relevant statute, 13 had states with higher 
monetary thresholds, “leaving only 8 States with statutes in respect to which 
subparagraph (M)(i)’s $10,000 threshold, as categorically interpreted, would have full 
effect. We do not believe Congress would have intended (M)(i) to apply in so limited 
and so haphazard a manner”). 
 91 Although developed in the immigration context, the circumstance-specific 
approach applies to ACCA. See United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700, 708 (4th Cir. 
2015) (acknowledging other courts’ application of this approach to ACCA and noting 
“we agree with those courts of appeals”). 
 92 Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41.  
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Nijhawan, restitution orders and federal presentencing reports have 
met the expanded criteria.93 
D. Mass Confusion in the Pre-2013 Framework 
Despite the Supreme Court’s narrative that the law had been settled 
for the past twenty-five years, as a practical matter, the federal courts 
and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) were truly developing 
confusing, conflicting, and ever-shifting rules in an attempt to be 
faithful to Taylor, Shepard, and Nijhawan. 
First, starting with Nijhawan, the circumstance-specific approach 
crept into unexpected — and later renounced — contexts. For 
instance, the BIA and some circuit courts extended this expanded 
factual inquiry into drug crimes.94 In Mellouli v. Lynch, the lawful 
permanent resident pled guilty to a Kansas state misdemeanor offense 
— possession of drug paraphernalia to store or conceal a controlled 
substance.95 Kansas regulated more substances than the federal 
schedule, rendering the statute overbroad at the categorical approach. 
At the modified categorical approach, the non-citizen had been 
charged with possessing a sock in which he had four unidentified 
orange pills. The complaint and plea agreement did not identify what 
substance those pills contained, which under Taylor would have 
prevented collateral consequences. 
The BIA nonetheless ordered him removed, arguing that Nijhawan 
permitted it to look at the arresting officer’s probable cause affidavit 
alleging that the defendant was arrested with what was believed to 
have been Adderall.96 Although the deportability ground was the 
generic controlled substance offense, the BIA reasoned — and Eighth 
Circuit affirmed — that Nijhawan applied because the immigration 
violation included a safe-harbor for those convicted of possessing 30 
 
 93 On the question of applying the Nijhawan test to appropriate grounds of 
inadmissibility, deportability, and aggravated felonies, the circuits do appear to be in 
relative agreement over when certain documents may be examined. See Fuentes v. 
Lynch, 788 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We therefore join the Second, Third, 
and Tenth Circuits in concluding that the BIA’s reliance on a PSR in conducting the 
circumstance-specific approach does not render a removal proceeding fundamentally 
unfair.”). In Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, 806 F.3d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 2015), the Fourth 
Circuit extended Nijhawan to a crime of domestic violence as defined by 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  
 94 In the deportability ground involving a conviction relating to a controlled 
substance, Congress excluded those offenses related to possession of 30 grams or less 
of marijuana. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
 95 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983 (2015). 
 96 See id. at 1985. 
  
2017] The Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation 2097 
grams or less of marijuana, which was akin to an attendant 
circumstance. Supreme Court reversed in forceful language, 
contending that the BIA’s Nijhawan interpretation “of the federal 
removal statute stretches to the breaking point,” reaching generic 
offenses not at all intended to be circumstance specific.97 
As the most glaring expansion, in 2008, Attorney General Michael 
Mukasey criticized the categorical approach when applied to crimes 
involving moral turpitude.98 Because the categorical approach focused 
on elements of a crime and not the actual conduct, the Attorney 
General argued that the categorical approach — as devised in Taylor 
— inherently would not mete out removal in a measured manner. His 
proposal was to breach the elements-only inquiry and permit 
documents that were not even on the Shepard list to be relevant. His 
examples included police reports (even though they usually excluded 
as hearsay in federal courts) and when a crime involved a minor, the 
victim’s birth certificates that were not even submitted at a criminal 
trial.99 The Attorney General justified the departure from elements on 
the basis that the Sixth Amendment limitation on fact-finding does not 
apply in the immigration context.100 By 2015, four circuits had 
overruled Silva-Trevino and two had endorsed the methodology.101 In 
 
 97 Id. at 1990. In a footnote, the Supreme Court clarifies that Nijhawan should not 
have applied in this context because the 30 grams or less phrase is not a triggering 
attendant circumstance, noting “the provision at issue here, has no such 
circumstance-specific thrust; its language refers to crimes generically defined.” Id. at 
1986 n.3. On remand, the Eighth Circuit did not accept this decision, remanding the 
BIA to consider a related question again employing this methodology. See Mellouli v. 
Lynch, No. 12-3093, 2015 WL 4079087, at *3 (8th Cir. July 6, 2015). 
 98 In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 695 (U.S. Att’y Gen. 2008) (arguing that 
the CIMT’s categorical analysis is under inclusive for looking only to what is the 
minimum conduct involved; such an approach prevents the IJ from removing 
individuals whose conduct met the CIMT but the statute of conviction does not).  
 99 Id. at 699 (“[I]mmigration judges should be permitted to consider evidence 
beyond that record if doing so is necessary and appropriate to ensure proper 
application of the Act’s moral turpitude provisions.”) In resolving a question of a 
crime involving a minor, Silva-Trevino suggested that the immigration court look at 
the victim’s birth certificate, regardless of that document was even admitted into the 
criminal trial. Id. at 709. 
 100 Id. at 701 (“First, immigration proceedings ‘are not criminal prosecutions, so 
the Sixth Amendment . . . [does] not come into play. Second, ‘how much time the 
agency wants to devote to the resolution of particular issues is . . . a question for the 
agency itself rather than the judiciary.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 101 See Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 911-16 (9th Cir. 2013) (as amended 
April 1, 2014); Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1057 (8th Cir. 2012); Prudencio v. 
Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 480-84 (4th Cir. 2012); Fajardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 
1303, 1307-11 (11th Cir. 2011); Mata-Guerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 260 (7th 
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2015, Attorney General Loretta Lynch vacated Silva-Trevino, 
recognizing that the Supreme Court twice rejected attempts to expand 
the circumstance-specific approach into the drug contexts.102 
Second, the most common error was simply utter and total 
confusion over how to interpret a state statute that did not match the 
generic definition of a crime but seemed to reach the generic crime. 
Before Descamps, federal courts had trouble ascertaining how to go 
about this. In United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca,103 a non-citizen 
who had been convicted under California’s burglary statute was 
alleged to have committed an aggravated felony as a burglary offense. 
In his later federal conviction for entry after an aggravated felony, he 
was subjected to a ten-year sentencing enhancement on this basis. 
California defined burglary as having an element of “entry,” without 
specifying if it was lawful or unlawful. The Aguila-Montes court agreed 
that under the categorical approach, the California statute was 
overbroad to generic burglary definition.104 It then proceeded to the 
modified-categorical approach to examine whether the facts 
underlying Mr. Aguila-Montes’s conviction evinced a lawful or 
unlawful entry.105 
Descamps reversed Aguila-Montes, explaining that the California 
statute was indivisible and merited no further inquiry (and no 
consequences attached). Prior to Descamps, no other circuit had 
resolved that question so simply. When confronted with the issue, 
Aguila-Montes detailed its own complicated procedural history and the 
Ninth Circuit’s ongoing struggle in devising various modifications to 
the approaches. “In the twenty years since Taylor, [the Ninth Circuit] 
ha[s] struggled to understand the contours of the Supreme Court’s 
framework. Indeed, over the past decade, perhaps no other area of the 
law has demanded more of our resources.”106 In an attempt to reach 
resolution, the Ninth Circuit developed the “missing element” 
approach and the “modified-factual approach” tests that ultimately 
proved unwieldy as facts derived from a defendant’s conduct were 
 
Cir. 2010); Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 582 F.3d 462, 472-82 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 102 See In re Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 552-53 (2015) (noting that both 
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010), and Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
1678 (2013), declined to apply the circumstance-specific approach past the Nijhawan 
context, which “cast doubt on the continued validity of the third step of the 
framework set out by Attorney General Mukasey’s opinion”).  
 103 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), abrogated by Descamps v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). 
 104 Id. at 943-44. 
 105 Id. at 945-46. 
 106 Id. at 917 (citing nine cases with differing applications of the framework). 
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haphazardly included or excluded from judicial inquiry.107 The 
doctrinal confusion was not limited to the Ninth Circuit. Four circuits 
developed tests but could not explain how they were grounded in the 
Supreme Court precedent.108 Two circuits simply always applied the 
modified categorical approach when faced with this issue.109 Three 
others were ambiguous regarding when and how they examined 
criminal records for the defendant’s conduct.110 
 
 107 See id. at 915, 943. In criticizing this practice, in Descamps, the Supreme Court 
noted that Aguila-Montes applied the modified categorical approach to § 459, but that 
other circuits were split on whether the modified categorical approach applies to 
statutes like § 459. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2282-83 (2013). Other 
circuits were uncertain as to the types of statutes to which the modified categorical 
approach would apply. Compare United States v. Armstead, 467 F.3d 943, 945-50 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (applying that approach to a similar, indivisible statute), with United States 
v. Beardsley, 691 F.3d 252, 268-74 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the modified 
categorical approach applies only to divisible statutes). 
 108 See United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 562-65 (4th Cir. 2010) (declining to 
apply the modified categorical approach to determine whether a state conviction for 
failure to stop for a blue light contained the element of criminal intent); United States 
v. Lipscomb, 619 F.3d 474, 491-92 (5th Cir. 2010) (limiting the modified categorical 
approach to cases involving “a statutory provision that covers several different generic 
crimes”); United States v. Boaz, 558 F.3d 800, 807-08 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Neither we 
nor the Supreme Court have approved a methodology that would decouple the limited 
review of record materials from an element-by-element analysis of the predicate 
offense.”); United States v. Giggey, 551 F.3d 27, 40 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Under the 
categorical approach, a federal sentencing court may not create a series of federal 
subcategorizations to fit the facts of a particular case.”). 
 109 See United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1276-77 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(reaching a similar result on procedural grounds); Armstead, 467 F.3d at 947-48 
(applying the modified categorical approach “[i]f the statutory definition embraces 
both violent and non-violent crimes or is otherwise ambiguous”). 
 110 See Oouch v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 633 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(noting that it “ha[s] not yet fixed on an approach for determining when a statute 
is . . . divisible”); Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 582 F.3d 462, 467 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(suggesting that the modified categorical approach cannot be applied to a missing 
element but not disavowing contrary precedent); Obasohan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 479 
F.3d 785, 788-90 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying the modified categorical approach 
without limitation).  
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II. DESCAMPS’ CLARITY AND RESULTING SOURCES OF CONFUSION 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Descamps v. United 
States . . . which adopted the elements-versus-means distinction, is 
the source of much of the confusion. . . . [I]t dismissed the concern 
that “distinguishing between ‘alternative elements’ and ‘alternative 
means’ is difficult,” telling us not “to worry.” 
— Fourth Circuit Judge Niemeyer, concurring in Omargharib 
v. Holder111 
I will be the first to admit, though, that the correct reading of 
Descamps (and in particular its footnote 2) is open to debate . . . . 
— Ninth Circuit Judge Watford, concurring in Almanza-
Arenas v. Lynch112 
As illustrated in the above quotes, Descamps was not embraced as 
providing clarity in what is a highly technical field. The resulting 
circuit split was based on conflicting doctrinal interpretations of what 
in fact the decision meant. Some circuits understood Descamps to 
interpret criminal statutes by reference to state law sources; others 
accepted Justice Alito’s criticism that “parsing state law” would result 
only in headache and confusion. The following section examines the 
disagreement between the Descamps’ majority and minority, the ways 
by which Descamps’ provided clarity to the prior problems outlined in 
Part I, and the nature of the resulting circuit split that predated Mathis. 
A. Descamps Removed Conduct and Provided a Clear Definition of 
Divisibility that Had Been Lacking 
Some federal judges, such as Judges Niemeyer and Judge Watford as 
quoted above criticized Descamps for being too confusing to apply. 
But, as illustrated in Part I, such criticisms overlook that in the pre-
Descamps’ era, the federal courts were rife with uncertainty and 
confusion over how to determine if ACCA or IIRIRA consequences 
applied. Before Descamps, federal courts had not developed consistent 
methodologies to figure out this question. Instead, the different 
circuits developed ad hoc methodologies — and some even gave up 
altogether — on how best to use facts or elements in determining if a 
particular statute was a match to its generic counterpart set forth in 
 
 111 Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 2014) (Niemeyer, J., 
concurring). 
 112 Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 469, 483 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(Watford, J., concurring). 
  
2017] The Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation 2101 
ACCA and IRRIRA. Descamps and Mathis clarified the answer to be 
never outside of circumstance-specific grounds. As set forth in the 
next few sections, this clarity has made a confusing field less so. 
If a statute was overbroad, prior to Descamps, the puzzle of whether 
a prior conviction matched the ACCA or immigration ground was 
resolved at random. Although the various circuits did not agree on 
how to employ the modified-categorical approach, they did agree that 
it would be applied in some manner that took into account what the 
defendant did. If the person’s conduct aligned with an element found 
in the generic offense, a match was found. The reason these courts 
proceeded to the modified-categorical approach was due mostly to the 
fact that there was no uniform definition of divisibility — neither 
between the circuits nor even within them. The 2009 Lanferman v. 
Board of Immigration Appeals decision is such an example.113 In 
Lanferman, a lawful permanent resident had allegedly threatened his 
wife with a gun. After his arrest, he pled guilty to a misdemeanor 
offense of menacing in the second degree, in violation of New York 
Penal Law section 120.14. The United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) charged him with a deportability 
offense relating to a conviction of a firearm offense.114 
The difficulty in this case arose because the menacing statute had 
one subsection with three separate clauses — demarcated with an “or” 
— identifying how the statute could be violated.115 The first part of the 
statute modified the actus reus with “by displaying a deadly weapon, 
dangerous instrument or what appears to be [types of guns]”; the 
second part modified the actus reus with placing a person in 
reasonable fear of physical injury; the third part was the knowing 
violation of protection order.116 Because the first part involved 
firearms and the last two did not, this statute presented the 
conundrum to the Court on whether Mr. Lanferman was convicted of 
an offense that met the definition of a generic firearms offense. 
The Second Circuit was at a loss on how to proceed with this 
statute. It outlined three possible means to divine divisibility: first by 
 
 113 See Lanferman v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 576 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 114 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (2008) (“Any alien who at any time after 
admission is convicted under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, 
exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying, or of attempting or conspiring to 
purchase, sell, offer for sale, exchange, use, own, possess, or carry, any weapon, part, 
or accessory which is a firearm or destructive device (as defined in section 921(a) of 
title 18) in violation of any law is deportable.”). 
 115 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.14(1) (2016). 
 116 Id. § 120.14. 
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whether the statute used disjunctives or subsections to demarcate the 
non-removable conduct from removable conduct; second by when the 
use of “or” in a statute “expresses such a specificity of fact that it 
almost begs an adjudicator to examine the facts at issue,” and third 
looking at the elements alone.117 (The last one was ultimately adopted 
in Descamps.) The Second Circuit did not resolve this question in 
2009, electing instead to remand the issue to the BIA. Even two years 
later when the same issue came up in a different case, the Second 
Circuit again punted by explaining that it “ha[d] not yet fixed on an 
approach for determining when a statute is thus divisible.”118 It was 
not alone. The Ninth Circuit, like others, was also shifting in devising 
its only divisibility test. By 2012, the Ninth Circuit’s defined a divisible 
statute as one expressly listing a finite list of how it can be violated 
and an indivisible one as having an implied list, which the Courts 
would figure out on their own.119 
The significance of the conflict illustrated in the Second Circuit’s 
and Ninth Circuit’s case law is that it underscores that two of 
Descamps’ greatest contributions was clarifying that divisibility has a 
set meaning and that it is the second step of the three-step doctrinal 
framework. 
Starting with the latter, Descamps clarified that divisibility was its 
own step. If a statute was indivisible, the inquiry ended and the 
modified categorical approach “has no role to play.”120 It cannot be 
overstated how significant this announcement was. Prior to Descamps, 
the Ninth Circuit admitted that this conception of divisibility and its 
usage in the analytic framework was “absent from our 
jurisprudence.”121 
As to the actual definition, a divisible statute was newly defined as 
one that could be met when a person violates the statute through 
different elements and an indivisible one was met by violating it 
through different means.122 Put another way, a divisible statute is one 
that creates several different crimes. An indivisible statute, by contrast, 
 
 117 Lanferman, 576 F.3d at 90 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 118 Oouch v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 633 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We 
have not yet fixed on an approach for determining when a statute is thus divisible.”). 
 119 United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam). 
 120 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013) (citing Nijhawan v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009)). 
 121 Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 122 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2291. 
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simply enumerates the different manners by which a singular crime 
can be committed. 
To make this concrete, returning to Lanferman, the statute at issue 
as it is written very much appears to be indivisible in that the crime of 
“menacing” is accomplished through three different types of actus 
reus that are set forth in the alternative as mutually independent 
means of violating the statute. Because all of the separate means are 
listed under a singular subsection, it appears that a violation of the 
generic statute cannot be further broken down to ascertain what 
precise means are in an actual conviction. This is significant because 
the fact that Mr. Lanferman used a gun against his wife is now 
immaterial. Whereas the courts previously looked at the conduct first 
to turn a conviction into a firearm offense because a gun was involved 
in the crime, Descamps demanded that the statute’s elements be 
examined without regard to specific facts. This change cannot be 
understated. 
Prior to Descamps, the courts erred in turning a number of offenses 
into ACCA and IIRIRA grounds that the state statute did not actually 
meet. As criticized by Justice Kagan, with unlimited “imagination” 
courts were rewriting old convictions into convictions that met the 
ACCA or IIRIRA ground. Such an error was critical because after 
Padilla v. Kentucky, defense counsel was advised to negotiate for a 
charged crime that would be without consequences.123 For courts to 
then turn New York’s menacing statute — one where guns were not a 
part of every element — into a firearms offense was attaching many 
more ACCA and IIRIRA consequences than what the statutes 
themselves demanded. If New York’s statute had been rewritten into 
three clear subsections that created three separate crimes defined as 
using a gun, stalking, and violating a protective, the statute would be 
divisible and the modified categorical approach could assist in 
identifying which subsection was the subject of the conviction. That 
methodology, however, was used first, whereas Descamps reserved it 
only for divisible statutes. 
Unlike the pre-Descamps landscape, the focus of the current 
modified categorical approach is on the construction of the statute and 
not on any conduct committed by the person. Even in circuits that 
used the textual approach that was rejected in Mathis, the courts often 
recognized that Descamps was a sea change. In 2015, the Eighth 
 
 123 See generally Seeking Post-Conviction Relief Under Padilla v. Kentucky after 
Chaidez v. U.S., IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT (Feb. 28, 2013), http:// 
immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Chaidez-advisory-FINAL-
201302281.pdf. 
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Circuit found a Minnesota obstruction of justice statute divisible 
because the enumerated actus reus could be achieved by physical force 
(meeting the definition of a crime of violence) and “resistance,” which 
did not involve violence because that actus reus could be met when a 
person curled up in the fetal position as a form of civil disobedience.124 
In Ortiz, the court used the textual approach (after Mathis, 
erroneously) to find the statute divisible. However, when proceeding 
to the modified categorical approach, the Ortiz case focused only on 
the conviction documents. When the records identify any statutory 
subsection that encompassed just the removable conduct, Ortiz held 
there was no match and no consequences attached. In this respect, 
even under the rebuked textual approach, an error made at the 
divisibility stage was corrected when courts narrowed the modified 
categorical approach as directed by Descamps.125 
Descamps thus did provide clarity that was missing in this doctrinal 
area. It provided a clear definition of divisibility and carved out a clear 
second step to what had been simply the categorical and modified 
categorical approaches. As much as confusion did remain (as 
discussed below), that confusion pales in comparison to the pre-
Descamps landscape when courts did not have a consistent and lasting 
definition of what a divisible statute was. 
As explained later, the significance of focusing on the elements of 
statute instead of the underlying conduct was that ACCA and IIRIRA 
consequences are less likely to attach.126 This means that fewer people 
are subjected to longer prison sentences and fewer non-citizens are 
deportable. Before examining that aspect of the doctrine, it is useful to 
see how Mathis resolved the circuit split that arose after Descamps. 
 
 124 Ortiz v. Lynch, 796 F.3d 932, 935-36 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.50 divisible). But this appears wrong. Under Mathis, the statute appears 
indivisible because the different actus reus are within a singular subsection and no 
other part of state law suggests that a jury must agree which conduct was involved in 
the crime. 
 125 But the correction did not always occur. As directed by Descamps, when a 
statute is indivisible, the records are not looked at, which means that if someone’s 
record identifies removable conduct the courts never should have relied on it when 
properly applying the divisibility analysis. Not all cases followed Descamps as 
faithfully as Ortiz did. The Eighth Circuit decision underlying the Supreme Court 
Mathis decision relied on conduct at the modified categorical approach stage too by 
relying on the information’s allegation of a garage to (erroneously) hold that the 
defendant was convicted of the subsection involving a building that met the generic 
burglary definition. See United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 126 See infra Part III.F. 
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B. The Rise of the Elements/Means Circuit Split 
As much as I argue Descamps ushered in clarity by asserting a 
meaningful definition of divisibility, the decision was not embraced as 
a panacea. To the contrary, the first questions for federal courts were 
what exactly is the difference between an element and mean and how 
would the courts know the difference. Returning to the quotes at the 
beginning of this Part, federal judges wrote pointed criticisms in 
concurrences and dissents, lamenting that the Descamps Court had yet 
to offer the keys to the code.127 
The grumblings grew into a circuit split as judges debated what 
exactly Descamps meant. Justice Alito appears to have successfully cast 
doubt over the scope of Descamps in his dissent. He began by 
clarifying that an element is something that the jury agrees on.128 
Although elements generally are stated in a text, courts have at times 
construed unmentioned elements in subsequent cases. Justice Alito 
continued to argue that knowing what is a means versus an element is 
a much more difficult proposition. In a Michigan statute not 
mentioned in the case, Justice Alito illustrated that the layers of 
complexity are many, requiring that a court can only ascertain what 
part of the statute is an element by looking to charging documents and 
other criminal record documents. In the course of demonstrating the 
difficulty, he cited to various states’ procedures that arrived at different 
results relying on different documents as evidence of an element. After 
establishing that there is no one method that all states follow, Justice 
Alito refutes the majority’s confidence by arguing that cases giving 
meaning to jury instructions do “not arise frequently.”129 
In footnote 2, the majority opinion responded to Justice Alito’s 
criticisms by refuting the notion that the difference between knowing 
ends and means is a “difficult” one to divine.130 The majority argued 
that as a practical matter, the Shepard documents will “reflect the 
crime’s elements.”131 Post-Descamps, the Ninth Circuit and Fourth 
Circuit followed this directive and relied on jury instructions and state 
cases that interpreted them. However, the footnote continued by 
assuring the readers that “a court need not parse state law in the way 
the dissent suggests: When a state law is drafted in the alternative, the 
court merely resorts to the approved documents and compares the 
 
 127 See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 128 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2296 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 129 Id. at 2302. 
 130 Id. at 2285 n.2 (majority opinion). 
 131 Id.  
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elements revealed there to those of the generic offense.”132 It is this 
warning against parsing state law that the majority of circuits, led by 
the Eighth Circuit, relied upon when arguing that one need only look 
at the statute’s text to determine what elements are set forth in the 
statute. 
To illustrate the circuit split, in Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that California’s theft statute was overbroad because 
the offense criminalized larceny (meeting the generic definition of 
theft) and fraud, theft of labor, and false credit reporting (outside of 
the generic definition of theft).133 On the divisibility question, 
California jury instructions and California Supreme Court cases were 
“unequivocal[]” in explaining that although jurors must agree that the 
defendant committed some form of theft enumerated in the statute, 
they do not need to agree on which one.134 Relying on state law as 
authority, the statute was held indivisible. The Fourth Circuit joined 
the Ninth Circuit in contending that this is the method that Descamps 
intended for federal courts to use to divine divisibility.135 
The majority of circuits departed from the majority in Descamps and 
followed the advice of Justice Alito’s dissent to employ a broader 
modified categorical approach to ascertain “what the jury in that case 
necessarily found or what the defendant, in pleading guilty, 
necessarily admitted . . . .”136 Descamps was an 8–1 decision, but 
Justice Alito’s dissent received much attention for its criticism that 
state law does not hold clear answers. 
The counter-textual approach was adopted by the majority of 
circuits, notably the Tenth, Eighth, Seventh, Sixth, and First 
Circuits.137 In United States v. Ozier, a Tennessee burglary statute had 
 
 132 Id.  
 133 Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 134 Id. at 869. 
 135 Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 198-99 (4th Cir. 2014) (“As we have 
previously held, however, use of the word ‘or’ in the definition of a crime does not 
automatically render the crime divisible. . . . Elements, as distinguished from means, 
are factual circumstances of the offense the jury must find ‘unanimously and beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’ In analyzing this distinction, we must consider how Virginia courts 
generally instruct juries with respect to larceny.” (citations omitted) (citing Rendon v. 
Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2014), to support the reliance on state law 
in the divisibility inquiry)).  
 136 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2300 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 137 See United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Rodriguez, 768 F.3d 1270, 1273-74 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Carter, 
752 F.3d 8, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054, 1065-66 
(6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Clinton, 591 F.3d 968, 972-73 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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four distinct elements defining how burglary is committed, and in 
relevant part, had a separate definition statute defining “habitation” in 
three separate subsections.138 The Sixth Circuit recognized that the 
third subsection of habitation was overbroad to the generic burglary 
offense in that it criminalized the burglary of tool sheds and 
outhouses. The Sixth Circuit nonetheless reasoned that the burglary 
statute was divisible and the overbreadth of habitation was immaterial 
because state law was not relevant. In supporting this reasoning 
(which was abrogated in Mathis), the Sixth Circuit quoted blocks of 
Justice Alito’s dissent for the contention that “Descamps expressly 
rejected defendant’s finite parsing of state law as to the difference 
between ‘means’ and ‘elements’. . . .”139 
Mathis resolved the split by affirming the reference to state law to 
parse out what is an element in a divisible statute and a means in an 
indivisible one. In the next Part, I look at how difficult the state law 
and textual approaches were to apply in practice. I also posit that the 
decisions’ emphasis on simplicity is not in fact relevant to “real world” 
considerations. 
III. MATHIS AND DESCAMPS ARE QUIETLY ENDING ACCA’S LENGTHY 
SENTENCES AND CRIME-BASED DEPORTATION 
As set forth in Part II, Descamps was not embraced as providing 
clarity to what is a highly technical field. In this Part, I look at actual 
cases to determine if those criticisms bore out in practice. A 
comparison of cases before and after Descamps, and a comparison 
between those that used the Descamps majority and dissenting 
approaches, yields interesting results. As a doctrinal matter, Justice 
Kagan was correct in asserting that Descamps’ approach is more 
consistent and workable compared not just to pre-Descamps case law 
but to the textual approach that Mathis refuted. As a practical matter, 
the result is that fewer criminal convictions serve as predicate crimes 
to ACCA and IIRIRA’s consequences. As a normative matter, 
prosecutors and judges are accepting, and even welcoming, this 
change. I argue that reducing crime-based deportation is also a 
normatively valuable result. 
 
 138 See United States v. Ozier, 796 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Tennessee 
statute). 
 139 Id. at 602-03. 
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A. In the “Real World,” the Competing Approaches Resulted in Courts 
More Easily Ascertaining Elements and Means Under State Law 
Mathis resolved the circuit split by contending that the Fourth 
Circuit and Ninth Circuit approach was the correct one — that the 
answer to whether a statute lists elements or means is found in state 
law and not simply the text of a statute. If the answer was not 
immediately known by reading jury instructions, then state cases and 
other parts of state criminal procedure provided answers. 
What is interesting is that in a dispute between the Mathis majority 
(again authored by Justice Kagan) and Justice Alito’s dissenting 
opinion, both asserted that their methodology was the easier one in 
the “real world.” Whereas in Descamps, Justice Alito noted that 
“[d]etermining whether a statute is divisible will often be harder than 
the Court acknowledges,”140 in Mathis, Justice Alito escalated his 
attacks. He noted that he had “warned that [Descamps’ divisibility 
inquiry is a] novel inquiry that would prove to be difficult.”141 He then 
cited to an en banc denial from the Ninth Circuit in which eight 
judges wrote separately. He addressed federal courts tasked with 
applying Mathis with “I wish them good luck,”142 and then continued 
with his critique that “[i]n the real world,” the easy cases will be hard 
to find.143 
Justice Kagan continued the same tone that she adopted in 
Descamps, asserting that applying Descamps (and now Mathis) was “a 
straightforward case.”144 Like Alito, she too doubled-down from the 
assertions of workability that she made in Descamps. In Descamps, 
Justice Kagan had argued that the elements-only approach was “long 
recognized” in precedent, that the contrary approach in Aguila-Montes 
was against clear Congressional intent, and it reached that result by 
“flout[ing]” Supreme Court precedent.145 In Mathis, the majority 
responded to Justice Alito’s “criticisms” with equal certainty that the 
elements or means methodology, announced in Descamps and affirmed 
in Mathis, is “easy in this case, as it will be in many others.”146 
Despite recognizing the “real world” and using its workability as a 
defense to their respective decisions’ legal reasoning, neither Justice 
 
 140 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2301 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 141 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2268 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id.  
 144 See id. at 2257. 
 145 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2287-88. 
 146 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2268. 
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Kagan nor Justice Alito actually attempted to quantify their assertions. 
This article then starts with an attempt to do just that. 
As it turns out, in the two-year period between Descamps and 
Mathis, the circuits that used either state law or textual analysis were 
able to reach their conclusions with relative ease. To compare the 
contrasting approaches to divisibility, I look at two of the federal 
circuits that produced roughly the same number of decisions during 
that time — the Fourth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit — which 
employed the contrasting approaches to divisibility. What is 
interesting is that the Eighth Circuit approach — the one predicted to 
be more simple — was actually not. Although the sample size is small, 
the similarities and differences are notable. 
Before discussing the result of this survey, it is important to note the 
methodology, value, and limitation of this comparison. Only two 
circuits — the Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit — were available 
to use to compare how the divisibility approach ultimately adopted in 
Mathis was working. The Ninth Circuit is a difficult circuit to use in 
any comparison because, based on 2015 statistics, it alone adjudicates 
48.70% of the nation’s immigration cases.147 The second highest 
circuit is the Second Circuit, which decides 15.2% of the nation’s 
immigration cases. Indeed, during the two-year window at issue, the 
Ninth Circuit issued over sixty published cases relating to the 
application of Descamps. By contrast, the Fourth Circuit adjudicates 
5.8% of the nation’s immigration cases and the Eighth Circuit 
adjudicates 2.4%, which is makes their caseload — with respect to 
immigration cases — fairly comparable.148 
The most immediate concern in comparing circuits is whether the 
results reflect a political bias rather than non-partisan information. 
Critics may assume that a comparison between the Fourth Circuit — 
comprised of fifteen active judges of whom nine were appointed by 
Democratic presidents — and the Eighth Circuit — comprised of nine 
active judges of whom eight were appointed by Republican presidents 
— will only reveal political preferences.149 But such assumptions are 
 
 147 See David North, Immigration, the Courts, and Statistics, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. 
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://cis.org/north/immigration-courts-and-statistics (citing statistics 
published by Immigration Law Advisor, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/02/vol10no1_ 
final.pdf). 
 148 See id. 
 149 Compare Judges of the Fourth Circuit, Since 1801, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH 
CIR., http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/docs/pdfs/historyjudges.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 
2017) (list of Fourth Circuit judges by appointment), with Active and Senior Judges, 
U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR EIGHTH CIR., http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/active-and-senior-
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belied by the fact that both the Fourth Circuit and Eighth Circuit defy 
ideological predictions when adjudicating general immigration cases. 
Both circuits are in the bottom three circuits that grant relief to non-
citizens. From 2015, when comparing the rates of deciding a case in 
favor of a non-citizen, the Seventh Circuit was the most favorable 
forum (ranked first) granting 25% of its claims, and the Fifth Circuit 
(ranked eleventh) was the least favorable forum, granting 2.5% of the 
claims presented to it. The mean for all eleven federal circuits is 
10.8%. The Fourth Circuit was ranked ninth with a 6.3% grant rate 
and the Eighth Circuit was tenth with a 4.3% grant rate. In this 
respect, when it comes to adjudicating general immigration cases, both 
circuits are predisposed towards denying 94% and 96% of the cases 
that come before it.150 
Given their circuits’ strong predisposition towards denying claims 
arising from immigration cases, the following findings that show a 
significantly higher grant rate among cases involving non-citizens with 
criminal convictions is a departure from their adjudications of these 
cases. The comparison between circuits is valuable, but an equally, if 
not more, important insight is the intra-circuit comparisons in which 
both circuits that start with a low adjudication rate reach consensus in 
reaching significantly higher favorable adjudication rates for non-
citizens with criminal convictions. 
A final concern in comparing circuits is why published and not 
unpublished cases are used. For all cases decided after January 1, 
2007, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure permits litigants to cite 
to unpublished decisions “for its persuasive value or for any other 
reason.”151 However, not all federal courts vet unpublished cases with 
the same procedures used for published decisions. For instance, 
whereas judges in the Third Circuit circulate drafts of published 
decisions to all judges to permit comment or request en banc review, it 
does not for unpublished decisions.152 My survey then just focuses on 
 
judges (last visited Mar. 24, 2017) (list of Eighth Circuit judges). 
 150 North, supra note 147. By comparison, from 2015, the other Circuits were in 
order of grant rate are Seventh Circuit (25%), Ninth Circuit (18.1%), Tenth Circuit 
(16.4%), First Circuit (13.9%), Third Circuit (11.1%), Eleventh Circuit (8.5%), 
Second Circuit (6.9%), Sixth Circuit (6.9%), Fourth Circuit (6.3%), Eighth Circuit 
(4.3%), Fifth Circuit (2.5%). Id. 
 151 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (advisory committee’s notes to 2006 amendment). 
 152 See Daniel Schlein, Rethinking the Role of Unpublished Authority, 2013 N.J. LAW. 
59, 62 (“The Third Circuit, by tradition and internal rule, does not cite to its own 
unpublished opinions as authority on the basis that they are not distributed to the full 
court for review and comment before filing. In contrast, a precedential opinion 
circulates to all members of the court for eight days before it is filed, allowing active 
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published decisions out of the belief that they are better reflections of 
reasoning employed by the whole court.153 
Turning to the comparison with these recognized limitations, the 
Fourth Circuit followed the approach relying on state law to 
determine the meaning of whether the statute described elements or 
means. In the Fourth Circuit, there were eleven published decisions 
between 2013 and 2015 that addressed whether a state or federal law 
was divisible. Of those cases, six were reached without any 
disagreement among the three judges regarding the proper outcome of 
the divisibility analysis.154 This is true even though these decisions 
were made by panels compromised of both Republican and 
Democratic appointees.155 Another five decisions were reached with a 
concurring opinion on a different matter.156 
 
judges who were not on the panel hearing the case to make comments or request an 
en banc hearing if ‘a judge believes that the issue requires the consideration of and 
determination by the full court.’”). 
 153 Some scholars have suggested that some judges make the decision to publish or 
not publish a case out of ideological or political reasons. See David S. Law, Strategic 
Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 817, 820 (2005) (“The results suggest that voting and publication are, for 
some judges, strategically intertwined: for example, judges may be prepared to 
acquiesce in decisions that run contrary to their own preferences, and to vote with the 
majority, as long as the decision remains unpublished, but can be driven to dissent if 
the majority insists upon publication.”). Even if that were true, focusing on published 
cases then is a further means to ensure that the published cases capture the mood of 
the court and not just the preferences of a judge as suggested by Professor Law. 
 154 United States v. Barcenas-Yanez, 826 F.3d 752, 754 (4th Cir. 2016) (Texas 
aggravated assault crime is indivisible); United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 802-
03 (4th Cir. 2016) (North Carolina robbery statute is indivisible); United States v. 
Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 200 (4th Cir. 2016) (New Jersey child endangerment statute is 
divisible); Castillo v. Holder, 776 F.3d 262, 270 n.7 (4th Cir. 2015) (Virginia theft 
statute is overbroad and indivisible); United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 340-41 
(4th Cir. 2013) (Maryland second-degree assault conviction is indivisible statute); 
United States v. Cabrera-Umanzor, 728 F.3d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 2013) (Maryland’s 
child abuse statute is indivisible). 
 155 Of the eleven cases, only one was decided by a panel of appointees from only 
one party. See Barcenas-Yanez, 826 F.3d at 754 (heard by two judges appointed by 
President Obama and one appointed by President Clinton); U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR 
FOURTH CIR., supra note 149. 
 156 See United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 514 (4th Cir. 2016) (federal “offense 
of interstate domestic violence” is divisible for ACCA purposes). Concurring opinion 
raised policy concerns over the result of Descamps’ methodology that “we do not 
consider what the individual to be sentenced has actually done, but the most lenient 
conduct punished by his statute of conviction.” Id. at 516 (Shedd, J., concurring); 
United States v. Vinson, 805 F.3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (resolving the 
earlier disagreement over whether North Carolina assault statute is not a triggering 
offense under ACCA, by resorting to the categorical approach. “Assuming without 
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The Fourth Circuit thus did not have a single disagreement over the 
meaning of whether state law resolved the question of divisibility, 
which comports with Justice Kagan’s pronouncement in Mathis that 
most cases will be readily resolvable. 
By contrast, the Eighth Circuit employed the textual analysis, the 
approach heralded as the simplest, given that the text should resolve 
most matters. The Fourth Circuit had fourteen published cases in the 
relevant two-year period that addressed divisibility. There were eleven 
cases that had no disagreement among the judges.157 Among these 
unanimous decisions, four were by panels where all three judges were 
 
deciding that the assault formulations amount to alternate elements creating separate 
forms of the offense, none of the forms of the offense require the level of intent 
necessary to qualify as an MCDV.”); Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 194 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (Virginia crime of larceny is indivisible). The concurrence agreed that 
precedent reached that result but advocated for using Justice Alito’s more expansive 
modified categorical approach. “Were the Supreme Court willing to take another look 
at this area of law, it might well be persuaded, when focusing on the goals of the 
categorical approach, to simply allow lower courts to consider Shepard documents in 
any case where they could assist in determining whether the defendant was convicted of 
a generic qualifying crime.” Id. at 202 (Niemeyer, J., concurring); United States v. 
Montes-Flores, 736 F.3d 357, 368 (4th Cir. 2013) (the South Carolina common law 
crime of violent injury was indivisible). Judge Shedd wrote a dissenting opinion 
relating to harmless error and did not take issue with the divisibility analysis of the 
majority. In United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 512 (4th Cir. 2013) (Maryland’s 
assault and battery of a police officer is divisible), the concurring and dissenting judge 
took issue with the Court’s failure to take up a sentencing error as meeting the plain 
error standard. Of note, the judge criticized the “prison-industrial complex” that 
reaches lengthy sentences from absurd results, such as this case in which a teenager 
spit on a police officer and received twenty-five years in prison for that conduct. See 
id. at 523-24 (Davis, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 157 Alonzo v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 951, 962 (8th Cir. 2016) (Iowa’s assault statute is 
divisible as a CIMT); United States v. Garcia-Longoria, 819 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 
2016) (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28–931(1) is divisible and modified categorical approach 
resolves issue); Kelly v. United States, 819 F.3d 1044, 1050 (8th Cir. 2016) (Iowa’s 
assault statute is textually divisible as an ACCA crime of violence); United States v. 
Shockley, 816 F.3d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 2016) (Missouri’s resisting arrest statute is 
divisible); United States v. Boman, 810 F.3d 534, 542 (8th Cir. 2016) (a maritime 
assault conviction is divisible “because the bases for his conviction were separated by 
the disjunctive ‘or’”); Ortiz v. Lynch, 796 F.3d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 2015) (Minnesota 
obstruction statute is divisible); United States v. Patrie, 794 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 
2015) (Iowa burglary statute divisible), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2539 (2016); United States 
v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 2015) (Iowa burglary statute divisible), 
rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016); United States v. Thornton, 766 F.3d 875, 877 (8th Cir. 
2014) (Kansas burglary statute is divisible); United States v. Martinez, 756 F.3d 1092, 
1097-98 (8th Cir. 2014) (Arizona weapons misuse statute is divisible and modified 
categorical approach does not permit conduct in information to render it a match); 
United States v. Pate, 754 F.3d 550, 554-56 (8th Cir. 2014) (Minnesota offense fleeing 
from police statute is divisible). 
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appointed by Republican presidents and seven were by panels where 
the judges were appointed by both Republican and Democratic 
Presidents. There was also one case in which the judge concurred with 
the divisibility analysis but raised policy objections to Descamps.158 
The majority of cases were then as Justice Alito predicted — if 
assuming that unanimity reflects agreement — easy to resolve. 
However, the Eighth Circuit did have two split decisions. In one 
case, the dissenting judge actually did disagree with the majority’s 
analysis rendering the statute divisible.159 The dissenting judge looked 
to Minnesota court cases to establish that the plain meaning of the 
statute had a different interpretation in practice. This dissenting judge 
is the sole judge appointed by a Democratic President who sits on the 
circuit with nine active judges.160 In the second case, which was an en 
banc decision, the concurring judge concurred with the divisibility 
analysis but raised concerns over its application to ACCA’s residual 
clause, a point that the Supreme Court later recognized in Johnson v. 
United States.161 This judge was a Republican appointee. 
Despite Justice Alito’s warning that looking to state law would be an 
endless morass, the Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit showed that the 
state law methodology has provided consistency in the decisions, no 
disagreement among judges on the panel, no notable political 
differences were part of the decision-making process, and clarity in 
state law interpretation of criminal statutes.162 But as explored later, 
 
 158 United States v. Bankhead, 746 F.3d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 2014) (Illinois 
dangerous weapons statute indivisible). In a concurrence, Judge Loken did not 
elaborate on why he felt bound by Descamps and what his policy disagreement with 
the case law was. See id. at 327 (Loken, J., concurring). 
 159 See Avendano v. Holder, 770 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2014) (Kelly, J., concurring 
and dissenting). Judge Kelly disagreed about the divisibility analysis and cited to 
Minnesota state law that ran counter, and gave context to, the text of the statute. The 
majority and dissent ultimately disagreed over whether Minnesota’s statute for terroristic 
threats was divisible as a CIMT. Judge Kelly was appointed by President Obama and the 
other two judges were appointed by President George W. Bush. 
 160 See U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR EIGHTH CIR., supra note 149. 
 161 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2554 (2015) (residual clause void for 
vagueness). In what turned to be a prescient concurrence, Judge Loken predicted the 
vagueness defect later announced in Johnson. See United States v. Tucker, 740 F.3d 
1177, 1184-87 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Loken, J., concurring) (subsection of 
Nebraska escape statute is indivisible). President George H.W. Bush appointed Judge 
Loken to the bench. 
 162 The Ninth Circuit was the only other Circuit to look to state law to determine 
divisibility. In the same time frame, the Ninth Circuit published over 60 cases 
involving divisibility. From a random sample, the agreement among the judges is also 
found here. Due to the lack of a comparably sized circuit that employed the 
disjunctive test, culling those results does not appear to add much to the simplicity 
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the value of simplicity in the Descamps/Mathis doctrinal methodology 
is not a meaningful means to assess whether there are dire collateral 
consequences to criminal convictions.163 
B. The Meaningful Difference Between the Approaches Lies in the 
Elimination of Collateral Consequences 
As stated above, there was not much difference in the different 
circuits’ ability to interpret a criminal statute under either the state law 
or textual approaches. Despite the centrality that “simplicity” had in 
the debate between Justice Kagan and Justice Alito, under either 
approach, the federal judges were able to reach consensus on which 
parts of a criminal statute are its elements and which ones are its 
means. Simplicity did not bear out as a lasting concern after Descamps. 
But, there is a very meaningful distinction in what happened when the 
circuits applied those different approaches. 
The Eighth Circuit textual approach resulted in just over half of its 
statutes no longer having ACCA or IRRIRA consequences. Specifically, 
the rates were eight cases divisible with consequences (57%),164 four 
divisible without consequences (29%),165 and two cases that were 
indivisible without consequences (14%).166 
 
question. 
 163 See infra Part III.C. 
 164 United States v. Garcia-Longoria, 819 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2016) (Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 28–931(1) is divisible and a match under modified categorical approach); 
Alonzo v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 951, 963 (8th Cir. 2016) (Iowa’s assault statute is divisible 
as a CIMT and remanded to determine if it is a match); Kelly v. United States, 819 
F.3d 1044, 1050-51 (8th Cir. 2016) (Iowa’s assault statute is textually divisible and a 
match); United States v. Boman, 810 F.3d 534, 542 (8th Cir. 2016) (a maritime 
assault conviction is a match); United States v. Patrie, 794 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 
2015) (Iowa burglary statute divisible and a match); United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 
1068, 1074 (8th Cir. 2015) (Iowa burglary statute divisible and a match), rev’d, 136 S. 
Ct. 2243 (2016); Avendano, 770 F.3d at 736 (Minnesota’s statute for terroristic threats 
was a CIMT based on conduct in crime); United States v. Pate, 754 F.3d 550, 554 (8th 
Cir. 2014) (Minnesota fleeing from police statute is an ACCA crime of violence under 
16(b)). 
 165 See United States v. Shockley, 816 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (8th Cir. 2016) 
(insufficient evidence to establish match to resisting arrest); Ortiz v. Lynch, 796 F.3d 
932, 938 (8th Cir. 2015) (obstruction statute divisible but not a match); United States 
v. Thornton, 766 F.3d 875, 879 (8th Cir. 2014) (Kansas burglary statute divisible but 
not a match); United States v. Martinez, 756 F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 2014) (Arizona 
weapons misuse statute is divisible not a match); Pate, 754 F.3d at 554 (Minnesota 
fleeing from police statute is divisible). 
 166 See United States v. Bankhead, 746 F.3d 323, 326-27 (8th Cir. 2014) (Illinois 
dangerous weapons statute indivisible); Tucker, 740 F.3d at 1181 (subsection of 
Nebraska escape statute is indivisible). 
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By contrast, the Fourth Circuit state law approach resulted in nearly 
three-fourths of its statutes being deemed indivisible, at a rate of eight 
statutes deemed indivisible (72% of prior crimes without collateral 
consequences)167 and three statutes held divisible (18% of prior crimes 
with collateral consequences).168 
These statistics are both limited and profound. They obviously do 
not provide accurate predictive value, given the sample size of the 
circuits and nature of the cases. 
But what they do show is that as a snapshot, the state law approach 
will result in a much more significant rate of eliminating collateral 
consequences for prior offenses. This is particularly true when 
considering that as a whole, in 2015, immigrant litigants succeeded at 
rates of 6.4% in the Fourth Circuit and 4.3% in the Eighth Circuit.169 
In 2014 and 2015, success for non-citizens with criminal convictions 
whose petitions presented the technical Descamps issue jumped to 
75% and 50% in these same circuits.170 At a minimum, it is 
unconvincing to write off judges who reach these results as ideologues 
who are expressing deep sympathy for non-citizens who commit 
crimes. To the contrary, such an extraordinary departure from the 
circuit’s ordinary predisposition to deny petitions from non-citizens 
suggests that the success rate is not driven by political allegiances. 
Rather, the marked departure from prior practice suggests that the 
judges are reaching this result through faithful application to a 
profound and new doctrine. 
 
 167 See United States v. Barcenas-Yanez, 826 F.3d 752, 758 (4th Cir. 2016) (Texas 
aggravated assault crime is indivisible); United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 802-
03 (4th Cir. 2016) (North Carolina robbery statute is indivisible); Castillo v. Holder, 
776 F.3d 262, 270 n.7 (4th Cir. 2015) (Virginia theft statute is indivisible); 
Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2014) (Virginia crime of larceny is 
indivisible); United States v. Montes-Flores, 736 F.3d 357, 368 (4th Cir. 2013) (South 
Carolina common law crime of violent injury was indivisible); United States v. Royal, 
731 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 2013) (Maryland second-degree assault conviction is 
indivisible); United States v. Cabrera-Umanzor, 728 F.3d 347, 350-51 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(Maryland’s child abuse statute is indivisible); see also United States v. Vinson, 805 
F.3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 2015) (assuming divisible but no consequences attach).  
 168 See United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2016) (federal 
“offense of interstate domestic violence” is divisible for ACCA purposes); United 
States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 2016) (New Jersey child endangerment 
statute is divisible); United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 512 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(Maryland’s assault and battery of a police officer is divisible).  
 169 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. See generally supra note 149 and 
accompanying text (listing Fourth and Eighth Circuit judges). 
 170 See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.  
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The Mathis majority did not discuss this aspect of Descamps. Justice 
Alito’s dissent did. He analogized the entire Taylor project to a Belgian 
driver who stubbornly and accidentally drove through two wrong 
countries before realizing that her GPS was malfunctioning.171 He argued 
that the end of collateral consequences is analogous in that Descamps has 
driven the Taylor doctrine off a cliff. Justice Alito noted that 
Congress indisputably wanted burglary to count under ACCA; 
our course has led us to the conclusion that, in many States, 
no burglary conviction will count; maybe we made a wrong 
turn at some point (or perhaps the Court is guided by a 
malfunctioning navigator). But the Court is unperturbed by its 
anomalous result. Serenely chanting its mantra, “Elements,” 
the Court keeps its foot down and drives on.172 
The Mathis majority opinion was silent in response, but Justice 
Kennedy, in a separate concurrence was not. Justice Kennedy 
lamented the hypothetical problem that the proper application of 
Descamps may result in a career offender “escap[ing] his statutorily 
mandated punishment” when the conviction records show that he 
committed the conduct that meets the generic definition at issue.173 
However, Justice Kennedy noted that it is the “Congressional 
inaction” and not the Supreme Court’s doctrine that is the cause of 
any undesirable policy outcome.174 
I contend that the problem with Descamps and now Mathis is not the 
bad guy getting off. The greater injustice arises when there is over-
punishment in that a minor crime becomes the basis to impose a ten- 
or fifteen- or twenty-year sentence or result in permanent banishment 
from this country. The greater flaw in ACCA and IIRIRA is the 
predicate assumption that collateral consequences can mete out fair 
and non-arbitrary results. 
C. IIRIRA and ACCA — Not Descamps — Lead to Arbitrary Results 
In struggling with its understanding of Descamps, federal judges 
themselves have criticized the “unfair” result of the hardened criminal 
escaping sentencing consequences and a sympathetic offender being 
saddled with ACCA’s lengthy sentence or IRIRRA’s harsh 
 
 171 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2266-67 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 172 Id. at 2268. 
 173 Id. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 174 Id.  
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deportation.175 Too often, these critiques are dismissed as only relating 
to arbitrariness.176 
But such a critique is lacking without understanding what exactly is 
wrong with arbitrariness. As observed by Professor Wright, 
“arbitrariness may be a bit harder to define than one might have 
imagined. One should carefully distinguish an arbitrary decision-
making process from a particular decision-making process that is 
arbitrarily unfair or biased.”177 Starting with the former definition, the 
state law approach set forth in Descamps (and endorsed by Mathis) is 
not arbitrary with respect to process that can reach a decision in a 
predictable manner. As evident in Part III’s comparison between the 
Fourth Circuit and Eighth Circuit approaches, federal judges, across 
ideologies and interests, are reaching the same conclusion with respect 
to the predicate questions asked in this legal inquiry. 
After Descamps, avoiding the reach of ACCA or IIRIRA is getting less 
arbitrary in that it is simply less likely to occur under the proscribed 
methodology. But, I argue arbitrariness — in terms of a lack of fairness 
— arises in this scheme because ACCA and IIRIRA — by design — 
lack any meaningful or measured fit to underlying offense that triggers 
these consequences. Under law, sentencing enhancements and 
deportation are technically not punishment.178 As a result, they cannot 
be curbed under the Eighth Amendment proportionality doctrine, ex 
post facto clause, substantive due process, equal protection, or other 
constitutional provisions that curb criminal punishment.179 
But this technicality does not foreclose the intuitive unease that 
arises when identical conduct is being penalized outside of criminal 
courts in different ways for different reasons. The fundamental 
problem with collateral consequences for criminal offenses, and 
 
 175 See supra notes 111–12. See generally Hairston v. Wilson, No. 1:14CV1067 
(TSE/MSN), 2015 WL 3622463, at *5 (E.D. Va. June 8, 2015) (“It is important to note 
that the result reached here is arrived with some reluctance, because the result — that 
petitioner must serve nearly 22 years in prison instead of perhaps as few as ten years 
or less — seems unfair under the circumstances.”).  
 176 See Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 515, 528 (9th Cir. 2016) (Owens, J., 
concurring) (lamenting Descamps because too often “[t]he only consistency in these 
cases is their arbitrariness”). 
 177 R. George Wright, Arbitrariness: Why the Most Important Idea in Administrative 
Law Can’t Be Defined, and What This Means for the Law in General, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 
839, 841 (2010). 
 178 See Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 310-14 (2015) (after discussing various challenges and why 
they failed, noting that “[c]ollateral consequences have thus escaped serious 
constitutional scrutiny [and] have effectively been held constitutionally immune”). 
 179 Id. 
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particularly IIRIRA’s reliance on them, is that they impose an 
additional penalty for a crime in a separate context that is not willing 
or able to distinguish the degrees of harm swept up by criminal law. 
Criminal statutes are designed to sweep in both minor and serious 
conduct, permitting prosecutors to use discretion in electing which 
offenses merit prosecution.180 Likewise, when defendants are adjudged 
guilty, indeterminate sentencing schemes direct judges to choose from 
a term in prison, a grant of probation, or a suspension of sentence to 
reflect the seriousness of the crime or the depravity of the offender. 
But collateral consequences, inherent to their nature, have no 
gradations or nuance, rendering them arbitrary and often 
disproportionate to the original crime. 
When a crime is a minor one, it becomes difficult to justify why 
deportation is a proportionate sanction. This is particularly true for a 
long-term lawful resident who has familial ties, has served in the 
military, or otherwise contributed to his or her community, in both 
small or large ways. Exiling non-citizens who are contributing ones, 
those that benefit the lives of citizens and the country as a whole is 
nonsensical, especially when the triggering crime is one that the 
criminal courts prosecuted as infractions — less serious than even 
misdemeanors, or the criminal court did not deem worthy of prison, 
jail, or even probation. At a minimum, there is a sense of 
disproportionally if deportation — in essence exile — can result for a 
offenses that the criminal courts did not consider serious, dangerous, 
or even worthy of punishment. In this context, what is being called 
unfair arises when — as noted by Eisha Jain — “[t]he underlying 
criminal record is used as a proxy, even though it may not correlate in 
 
 180 For instance, Congress enacted the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in the hopes of 
preventing, or at least punishing, those responsible for another crisis that arose from 
“Enron’s massive accounting fraud and revelations that the company’s outside auditor, 
Arthur Andersen LLP, had systematically destroyed potentially incriminating 
documents.” Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015). To reach conduct 
that the prior laws did not, Congress thus elected to criminalize those who falsified or 
destroyed evidence that interfered with a federal investigation. In Yates, the 
government prosecuted a commercial fisherman under this statute when he threw 
undersized fish overboard to evade civil violations for catching undersized grouper. Id. 
at 1076. The Supreme Court rejected the prosecutor’s interpretation to apply this 
statute outside of the financial fraud context. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the terms of the statute were written in a manner that the ordinary 
meaning would cover such breadth through the term “tangible object.” Id. at 1081-87 
(“We agree with Yates and reject the Government’s unrestrained reading. ‘Tangible 
object’ in § 1519, we conclude, is better read to cover only objects one can use to 
record or preserve information, not all objects in the physical world.”). 
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a meaningful way to risk assessment or to the relevant regulatory 
priority.”181 
By their very definition then, collateral consequences set forth in 
ACCA and IRRIRA are inherently arbitrary and unfair because they 
punish the past and neither are in accord with present circumstances 
nor the goals of the subsequent federal firearm offense or immigration 
status. 
D. Ending ACCA Consequences Serves Criminal Justice Goals 
In the ACCA context, prosecutors, federal judges, and policy-
makers are openly receptive to this real-world impact that Descamps is 
ending collateral consequences. In 2015, after the Supreme Court 
struck down ACCA’s residual clause as being void for vagueness,182 
federal prosecutors “urged courts to grant prisoners permission to file 
successive petitions” that would allow them to eliminate the additional 
time imposed by their ACCA sentencing enhancement.183 Permitting 
the reduction of a prison sentence is a remarkable departure from 
prior practices whereby federal prosecutors were criticized for seeking 
heightened sentences that bordered on zealotry.184 
In 2013, a federal judge made a pointed criticism of ACCA for 
supporting the “prison-industrial complex” that arises from lengthy 
sentences.185 The Fourth Circuit Judge Andre Davis wrote a dissent in 
 
 181 Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1209-10 
(2016). 
 182 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2554-55 (2015) (striking down 
ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague). 
 183 Leah M. Litman & Luke C. Beasley, Jurisdiction and Resentencing: How 
Prosecutorial Waiver Can Offer Remedies Congress Has Denied, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 
ONLINE 91, 92 (2016) (“It waived the argument that prisoners who were sentenced 
under ACCA’s residual clause have not satisfied the conditions to file successive 
petitions for post-conviction review.”). 
 184 The most outrageous example of seeking a lengthy sentence regardless of the 
merits of a case is the practices used in securing plea agreements for drug convictions. 
Prosecutors often included a clause in a plea agreement requiring the defendant to 
waive any right to bring collateral challenge to his conviction even when there was 
undisputed evidence of innocence. The federal prosecutors would also expedite 
convictions by giving defendants 30 days to accept a lengthy sentence in exchange for 
not charging a prior offense that trigger a mandatory 10-year or 20-year minimum 
sentence for past crimes. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE: HOW 
U.S. FEDERAL PROSECUTORS FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 1-9, 88-89 
(2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf.  
 185 United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 523 (4th Cir. 2013) (Davis, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“For years now, all over the civilized 
world, judges, legal experts, social scientists, lawyers, and international human rights 
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which he criticized the absurd result of the particular decision 
upholding a twenty-five year prison sentence for an offense, 
committed as a teenager, when he spit on a police officer. Because that 
conduct was prosecuted as an assault and battery it was deemed a 
crime of violence under ACCA.186 
In May 2016 — in a forty-two-page decision — U.S. District Court 
Judge Frederic Block went further than mere commentary. In 
imposing a sentence, Judge Block significantly departed downward 
from the United States sentencing guidelines’ recommended prison 
term of 33 to 41 months and granted a one-year probationary 
sentence.187 Judge Block did so to avoid what he called a “civil death,” 
arising from the myriad collateral consequences that attach to a felony 
drug conviction.188 Judge Block also noted that state and federal 
governments impose up to 50,000 collateral consequences to any one 
who commits a felony, which prevents people from getting housing, 
employment, student loans for education, and public assistance for 
disabilities or medical care.189 Judge Block’s decision is remarkable in 
that he avoided a recommended prison sentence to prevent the 
imposition what he called disproportionate consequences arising from 
the thousands of collateral consequences that attach to a felony drug 
conviction. 
In August 2016, the United States Sentencing Commission 
recommended to Congress that it amend the ACCA to eliminate drug 
predicates in their entirety.190 This recommendation was based on 
higher rates of recidivism correlating to those convicted of violent 
crimes and not drug trafficking offenses.191 It no doubt must have 
 
and social justice communities have been baffled by the ‘prison-industrial complex’ 
that the United States has come to maintain. If they want answers to the ‘how’ and the 
‘why’ we are so devoted to incarcerating so many for so long, they need only examine 
this case. Here, a 26-year-old drug-addicted confessed drug dealer, abandoned by his 
family at a very young age and in and out of juvenile court starting at age 12, has more 
than fourteen years added to the top of his advisory sentencing guidelines range (387 
months rather than 211 months), because, as a misguided and foolish teenager, he spit 
on a police officer.” (citation omitted)). 
 186 Id. at 516 (majority opinion). 
 187 United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).  
 188 Id.  
 189 Id. at 184-85. 
 190 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER 
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS 2-3 (2016), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/criminal-history/201607_RtC-Career-
Offenders.pdf#page=5. 
 191 Id.  
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been informed by the societal shift in treating opioid addiction with 
treatment instead of incarceration.192 
Not since the 1970s has the larger society been engaged in serious 
questions about the nature and effects of the criminal justice system 
are being raised and considered. The numbers are well known: the 
United States has 5% of the world’s population and over 20% of its 
prison inmates.193 This current mass incarceration has not been the 
norm, with a 400% increase in the prison population in the past forty 
years.194 It is now widely recognized that mass incarceration has been 
too costly with respect to long prison sentences, the loss of human 
capital, the racial disparities in convictions, the financial toll of mass 
incarceration, and the ineffectual nature of prisons to stop crime.195 
Whether it be out of ideals of justice or the more mundane fidelity 
to costs, even those traditionally calling on tough on crime measures 
are now seeking a reduction of prisoners through Smart on Crime 
 
 192 See, e.g., Editorial, Congress Wakes Up to the Opioid Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, May 
16, 2016, at A22 (discussing the 18 bills Congress has passed and the proposed 
$1.1 billion in funding President Obama is seeking for drug treatment); Tom Howell 
Jr., Senate Overwhelmingly Approves Bill to Fight Deadly Opioid, Heroin Epidemic, 
WASH. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/mar/10/ 
senatepassesbillfightopioidheroinepidemic (reporting on Senate passing a bill by a 94–
1 vote to support additional funding for opioid treatment); Robert Pear, Governors 
Devise Bipartisan Effort to Reduce Opioid Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2016, at A9 
(“Alarmed at an epidemic of drug overdose deaths, the National Governors 
Association decided over the weekend to devise treatment protocols to reduce the use 
of opioid painkillers.”); Katharine Q. Seelye, Massachusetts Chief’s Tack in Drug War: 
Steer Addicts to Rehab, Not Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 24, 2016, at A1 (reporting on 
Gloucester’s police department informing addicts that if they come to the station 
asking for help, the police will not arrest them but will direct them to a program that 
assists them in securing treatment seek help they will not be arrested). 
 193 The Prison Crisis, ACLU (Jan. 20, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/prison-crisis. 
 194 Jonathan Wroblewski, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, U.S. 
Department of Justice Sentencing and Corrections Reform: Where We Are and Where 
We’re Headed 5 (June 2016) (on file with author). This current mass incarceration has 
not been the norm. To the contrary, in 1972, there were 196,092 prisoners in federal 
and state prisons. By 2014, the numbers had risen over 400%, to a population of 
1,508,636. 
 195 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 96-97 (discussing racial disparities and 
the exponential rise in the U.S. prison population); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison 
Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 886-87 (2009) (“Over 
the last 35 years, the population of America’s prisons and jails has soared from 
approximately 360,000 to over 2.3 million people. More than one in a hundred 
American adults is currently behind bars.”); Emily Badger, The Meteoric, Costly and 
Unprecedented Rise of Incarceration in America, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/04/30/the-meteoric-costly-
and-unprecedented-rise-of-incarceration-in-america/. 
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initiatives.196 Common reforms include shorter sentences for non-
violent crimes, alternatives to prison sentences for low-level crimes, 
improvement in reentry programs, and a reinvestment of funding into 
community services.197 At the federal level, the Attorney General’s 
Smart on Crime initiative, began in 2013, brought an eleven percent 
reduction of the prison population by 2016.198 
Federal and state governments are in agreement by enacting policy 
measures that reduce many of those collateral consequences. President 
Obama and state governments are championing the “ban the box” 
policies in an effort to permit former prisoners to obtain gainful 
employment.199 States are restoring voting rights to those convicted of 
 
 196 See, e.g., Molly Ball, Do the Koch Brothers Really Care About Criminal-Justice 
Reform?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/ 
03/do-the-koch-brothers-really-care-about-criminal-justice-reform/386615 (discussing 
the alliance between the liberal activist Van Jones and the conservative Koch brothers 
on criminal justice reform efforts). 
 197 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SMART ON CRIME INITIATIVE 1-3 
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/ag/attorney-generals-smart-crime-initiative (explaining the 
programs, providing policy documents and fact sheets, and showcasing local successful 
reentry programs); Samantha Finch, America’s Recidivism Problem Will Be Fixed Through 
Prison Education Programs, PARENT HERALD (June 21, 2016), http://www. 
parentherald.com/articles/50251/20160621/america-s-recidivism-problem-will-fixed-
through-prison-education-programs.htm (discussing offender reentry programs that are 
preventing recidivism in California, Texas, and Idaho); Maggie Kreins, Is Proposition 47 
Working the Way It Was Sold to Voters?, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20160224/is-proposition-47-working-the-way-it-was-
sold-to-voters-guest-commentary (discussing successes and drawbacks to Proposition 47, 
which reduced the prison population and promised community resources to prevent 
crime); Robin Respaut, California Prison Reforms Have Reduced Inmate Numbers, Not Costs, 
REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0UK0J520160106 
(discussing how California reduced its prison population by 30,000 within five years). 
 198 Wroblewski, supra note 194 at 18. The number of total inmates sentenced to 
federal prisons dropped from 214,149 in 2013 to a projected 195,933 in 2016. 
 199 Bouree Lam, Obama’s Proposal to ‘Ban the Box’ for Government Jobs, ATLANTIC (May 2, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/05/obama-memorandum-
opm/480909 (discussing the proposed federal rule to bar federal agencies from asking 
about past criminal history, a proposal that would impact the 70 million Americans “who 
have some kind of criminal record”); see About: The Ban the Box Campaign, BAN BOX, 
http://bantheboxcampaign.org/about (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) (“The campaign 
challenges the stereotypes of people with conviction histories by asking employers to 
choose their best candidates based on job skills and qualifications, not past convictions. 
Since 1 in 4 adults in the U.S. has a conviction history, the impact of this discrimination is 
widespread and affects other aspects of life in addition to employment opportunity.”). The 
website lists the “over 45 cities and counties” and 7 states that have removed such a 
question from their own employment applications. Id. “Some cities and counties and the 
state of Massachusetts have also required their vendors and private employers to adopt 
these fair hiring policies. In some areas, private employers are also voluntarily adopting ban 
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felonies.200 Policies are no longer targeting recidivism through longer 
prison sentences.201 The new initiatives have a different approach, 
giving released offenders access to the community — such as short-
term housing and food and continuing relationships with community 
volunteers and law enforcement members who assist in their 
reintegration.202 It is an intuitive solution. If we want people to belong 
to a community, it makes sense to surround released offenders with 
the means to do so. 
It is not of any surprise that the rollback of ACCA’s lengthier 
sentences is not causing alarm among prosecutors, judges, or policy 
makers. Adding additional prison time in the federal firearm-
sentencing context for prior conduct — that is often remote or not 
seemingly related — is not furthering any identifiable need. ACCA’s 
legislative goal of preventing recidivism of violent career criminals 
(and especially non-violent drug offenders) has been outweighed by 
the scars of mass incarceration. What is interesting to me is that there 
has not been an equal embrace of reducing immigration consequences 
of the over-punishment arising from deporting non-citizens for minor 
crimes. The following sections suggest that there should be. 
 
the box hiring policies.” Id. 
 200 See Michael Wines, Virginia Governor Says Fight for Felons’ Voting Rights Is Not 
Over, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2016, at A18. After the Virginia Supreme Court blocked 
Governor Terry McAuliffe’s blanket declaration to restore voting rights for 206,000 ex-
felons, the governor vowed to sign 206,000 restoration orders on an individual basis. 
The governor justified his policy on the basis that Virginia would join the 40 other states 
that restore voting rights after felony convictions. Id.; see BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., 
CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES (2016), http://www. 
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Criminal_Disenfranchisement_Map.pdf 
(updated data and procedure by state). 
 201 On average, a defendant in the United States will receive a sentence two to five 
times longer than the same crime receives in Western Europe. JUSTICE POL’Y INST., 
FINDING DIRECTION: EXPANDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS BY CONSIDERING POLICIES OF 
OTHER NATIONS 1-4 (2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/ 
documents/sentencing.pdf. The shorter sentences are important because housing, 
feeding, and caring for elderly and ill prisoners comes at a steep financial cost to 
taxpayers. See DIRK K. GREINEDER, MASS(ACHUSETTS) INCARCERATION: HOW JUSTIFIED 
AND HOW MUCH PUBLIC SAFETY DOES IT ACTUALLY BUY? 24-25 (2011), http:// 
www.realcostofprisons.org/writing/Greineder_Mass_achusetts_Incarceration.pdf. 
 202 Reentry Services, IDAHO DEP’T CORR., https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/ 
probation_and_parole/reentry_services (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) (listing support 
and services that released offenders receive). The state claims that since it has been 
adopted in 2009, it has had an “important role” in reducing recidivism. Id.  
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E. Why Simplicity Was Likely Valued in Descamps and Mathis 
In Mathis, when navigating what was obviously a very difficult 
doctrine, Justice Kagan took almost a scolding tone towards the 
Eighth Circuit and suggested that the Descamps result was obvious 
and clear-cut. Justice Kagan made stinging rebukes against the Eighth 
Circuit, arguing that its approach in Aguila-Montes was against clear 
Congressional intent and announcing that the elements-only rule had 
been the law for the past twenty-five years.203 In Descamps itself, 
Kagan, who wrote for the majority, almost made fun of the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning, illustrating the soundness of its (new) divisibility 
definition with reference to the children’s Clue board game, a glib jab 
that borders on mockery.204 
Nowhere in the opinion does the Supreme Court recognize how 
much all of the circuits — not just the Ninth Circuit — struggled 
mightily with when and how to apply the categorical and modified 
categorical approaches. There was no mention that all of the circuits 
lacked a uniform definition of divisibility and some even had stopped 
trying to develop one. Further, there was no mention that divisibility 
was a new step, for the first time defined and defended in Descamps. 
As a result, I think that the majority’s dismissive tone towards the 
difficulties courts had applying ACCA and IIRIRA contributed to the 
incongruous result of a dissent in an 8–1 decision becoming the 
holding in over half of the circuits. Justice Alito started his dissent by 
recognizing that the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that a rule is 
simple does not make it so. To the contrary, Justice Alito began by 
contending that as much as “the concept . . . for burglary might seem 
simple, things have not worked out that way under our case law.”205 
Justice Alito then acknowledged that the elements/mean distinction “is 
not required by ACCA or by our prior cases” and further argued that 
this new rule — not ordained by precedent or Congress — “will cause 
serious practical problems.”206 This empathetic approach worked as an 
effective appeal to the circuits. 
As a legal matter, I do agree that the debunked textual approach is 
lacking for many reasons. As recognized by Justice Alito himself in the 
Descamps dissent, state and federal courts often will amend a statute to 
interpret an element in a narrow or broad way or even write in a 
modified element without such changes being expressly noted in the 
 
 203 See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016).  
 204 See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2291 (2013). 
 205 Id. at 2295 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 206 Id. at 2297. 
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statutory text.207 Justice Alito cited Neder v. United States as such an 
example whereby the Supreme Court wrote in a materiality element 
into a federal mail fraud statute “even though that element is not 
mentioned in the statutory text.”208 As observed by Justice Alito, it is 
difficult to “think of any reason why an authoritative decision of this 
sort should be ignored . . . .”209 Relying only a statute’s text to divine 
its full meaning was a method mired in inaccuracies. 
A secondary problem from relying only on the text of the statute is 
that words alone overlook that state courts interpreting these statutes 
do so based on actual facts that are often difficult to imagine. The 
earlier-mentioned Avendano v. Holder case illustrates just this aspect of 
statutory construction. In Avendano, a Minnesota statute defined the 
offense of terroristic threats as occurring when someone “threaten[s], 
directly or indirectly to commit a crime of violence” and with 
alternative mens rea of a “purpose to terrorize another” or “in a 
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.”210 The Eighth 
Circuit reasoned that this statute was divisible as defined by Descamps 
“because it provides alternative culpable mental states [of purpose and 
reckless].”211 
Assuming that the plain meaning of the text is the entirety of the 
statute’s meaning is an intellectually inadequate approach to statutory 
construction. As noted by the concurring and dissenting opinion, 
Minnesota cases defined the reckless element in the terrorist threat 
statute to include conduct that fell outside of the immigration law’s 
definition of what is a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). For 
instance, the Minnesota Court of Appeals permitted a conviction based 
 
 207 When determining that a North Carolina statute is not a crime of violence 
under ACCA, the Fourth Circuit noted that the statute’s text provided that it is a 
crime for a person to “willfully or wantonly discharge[] or attempt[] to discharge any 
firearm . . . into any building, structure, vehicle, [or other specified physical structure] 
while it is occupied.” United States v. Parral-Dominguez, 794 F.3d 440, 445 (4th Cir. 
2015) (quoting statute). The text alone did not resolve this matter because 
“[a]lthough not listed as an element in the statute, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina has read a knowledge element into the offense.” Id. (citations omitted).  
 208 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2296-97 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 20 (1999) (federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes 
require proof of materiality even though such element is absent from the statutory 
text)). 
 209 The full quote is “I cannot think of any reason why an authoritative decision of 
this sort should be ignored, and the Court has certainly not provided any. I therefore 
proceed on the assumption that a statute is divisible if the offense, as properly 
construed, has the requisite elements.” Id. at 2296-97. 
 210 Avendano v. Holder, 770 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 211 Id. at 734. 
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on evidence of a “joke or flippant remark,” one made out of 
“transitory anger,” and one when no one in fact experienced fear.212 
Although Avendano case was resolved based on the later reversed 
Silva-Trevino doctrine, it shows that the textual approach was far from 
reliable as an accurate measure of what conduct was actionable under 
any given statute. 
Mathis corrected this inaccuracy when overturning the Eighth 
Circuit’s approach. But what is more interesting is why in a dispute 
over what happens in the “real world,” real world considerations of 
how collateral consequences operate was absent from the defense of 
Descamps’ approach.213 
F. Proportionality Is Being Restored Through Descamps and Mathis 
Returning to the debate between Justice Kagan and Justice Alito 
over whether Descamps provides a framework that simplifies the work 
that courts have to undertake when applying ACCA and IIRIRA 
consequences, a more salient question is whether ACCA and IIRIRA 
consequences further proportionality. To date, proportionality has not 
been an effective lens by which to examine immigration law and 
collateral consequences. Because deportation proceedings are 
classified as civil ones, the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality 
doctrine has not applied.214 In the past decade, the Supreme Court has 
revived the Eighth Amendment as a check on limiting capital 
punishment, certain lengths of sentences, and prison conditions.215 
 
 212 Id. at 739 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 213 Not mentioned in this Article was the various decisions’ focus on Apprendi and 
fact-finding. For an excellent discussion of this, see generally Sharpless, supra note 85. 
 214 “The contention that the application of the deportation statute to an alien with 
near lifelong residence in this country and no connections with the country to which 
deportation is to be made is a violation of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments presents 
an emotional but not a legal argument.” LeTourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th 
Cir. 1976). “Deportation is strictly a Congressional policy question in which the 
judiciary will not intervene as long as procedural due process requirements have been 
met. This court has also held that deportation is not cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment even though the penalty may be severe. . . . Deportation 
is not criminal punishment . . . .” Id. at 1370 (citations omitted). But see Angela M. 
Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation, 62 EMORY L.J. 
1243, 1267-69, 1278 (2013) (discussing some problems with the lack of 
proportionality in deportation matters and arguing that the proportionality concerns 
protected by the Eighth Amendment may normatively and legally be imported into the 
immigration context). 
 215 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (LWOP for juveniles 
violates the Eighth Amendment); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 499-503 (2011) 
(upholding order for California to reduce its prison population because overcrowding 
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Even in the criminal context, proportionality has yet to emerge as a 
meaningful check on recidivism statutes.216 
But in the law, the past does not always predict the future. The 
Descamps methodology has resulted — and will continue to result — 
in widespread elimination of collateral consequences.217 The judges 
who properly apply Descamps and Mathis are not intending to create 
policy or even attempting to enter a larger discussion about the reform 
of collateral consequences. But as a practical matter, federal courts are 
eliminating ACCA and IIRIRA consequences on a case-by-case, 
statute-by-statute basis. 
In this respect, Justice Alito’s call for having a test that promotes 
simplicity, that makes it easy for courts to figure out what the result 
will be, sorely misses what ACCA and IIRIRA implicate. As Fourth 
Circuit Judge Andre Davis observed in a dissent in an ACCA case, 
“Our disagreement as to the outcome in this case stems, I think, less 
over the content and application of relevant precedent and more from 
a fundamental disagreement regarding our role as arbiters of a flailing 
federal sentencing regime.” Judge Davis forcefully argued for judges to 
reduce lengthier sentences to avoid “the harmful effects of over-
incarceration that every cadre of social and political scientists (as well 
 
inflicts cruel and unusual punishment to mentally and physically ill prisoners); Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-560 (2005) (capital punishment for juveniles violates 
the Eighth Amendment proportionality clause). But see Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 
2726, 2731 (2015) (upholding execution using midazolam did not constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment). 
 216 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28, 30-31 (2003) (upholding California’s 
three strikes law when the last strike involved the theft of golf clubs). There is ambiguity 
on this issue. On the one hand, the Supreme Court is not taking up challenges to lengthy 
prison terms imposed for drug crimes. However, the old precedent that permitted these 
sentences did so in an era when drugs were presumed to be part of violent crimes. Now 
that drug addiction is seen as a disease, opioid addiction is being met with treatment and 
not incarceration. It appears that the old Supreme Court cases from the 1980s and 1990s 
are due for reconsideration as the premise for imposing lengthy sentences on drug 
crimes is reconfigured by society at large. 
 217 In Vera-Valdevinos, the Ninth Circuit held that Arizona’s statute that prohibits 
the possession, selling, manufacturing, administering, procuring, transporting, 
importing, and offering to transport a “narcotic drug.” The statute was held indivisible 
as to both an aggravated felony (as “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”) and 
as a deportable ground (a controlled substance offense). See Vera-Valdevinos v. 
Lynch, 649 F. App’x 597, 597-98 (9th Cir. 2016). Unlike other states such as 
California, the Arizona jury instructions do not direct jurors to find the actual identity 
of a narcotic. The operation of Arizona law means that those individuals who are 
convicted under this statute no longer have immigration consequences — if they have 
lawful status, they cannot be removed or if they are without lawful status, this crime 
cannot bar from relief. See id.  
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as an ever-growing cohort of elected and appointed officials, state and 
federal, as well as respected members of the federal judiciary) has 
recognized as unjust and inhumane, as well as expensive and 
ineffectual.”218 
In this respect, restoration of proportional consequences for crimes, 
not easy tests for courts to follow, is the salient impact the Descamps 
and Mathis is having. For ACCA, eliminating a mandatory sentencing 
enhancement for federal firearm offenses does not interfere with the 
appropriate sentence that the current offender will receive. Likewise, 
under IIRIRA, eliminating criminal convictions as immigration 
grounds does not undermine immigration enforcement. Criminal 
convictions have been a crude, overinclusive means to deny and take 
away immigration status. Their elimination is restoring proportionality 
to IIRIRA’s mistaken assumption that all offenses are serious and all 
offenders are dangerous. Although the justices did not consider 
proportionality in their defense of Descamps, there is no doubt that the 
restoration of proportionality to immigration law is the most 
compelling impact that Descamps is having in the real world. 
IV. THE NEEDED END TO CRIME-BASED DEPORTATION 
It is difficult to think of a more politically charged issue than 
immigration policy, especially on the treatment of non-citizens who 
commit crimes. In the public arena, one need not look past the 2016 
presidential campaign for examples of how the public debate is heated 
and can delve quickly into inflammatory rhetoric.219 But as a practical 
matter, in five years, numerous state and federal crimes will be 
mitigated or eliminated as removal offenses.220 Given that likely 
 
 218 United States v. Valdovinos, 760 F.3d 322, 330 (4th Cir. 2014) (Davis, J., 
dissenting) (“Our disagreement as to the outcome in this case stems, I think, less over 
the content and application of relevant precedent and more from a fundamental 
disagreement regarding our role as arbiters of a flailing federal sentencing regime. . . . I 
deeply regret the panel’s failure to take advantage of the opportunity to do so here.”). 
 219 See Christopher N. Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and Dog-Whistle Politics, 42 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 159, 185-86 (2016) (discussing recent 
contemporary events and commenting on “[t]he ease with which the agenda-setting 
move was accomplished betrays the depth of the identification of immigrants with 
criminality”); Patrick Healy, A Second President Clinton? Mapping out Her First 100 
Days, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2016, at A1 (contrasting Hillary Clinton’s promise for 
immigration reform and Donald Trump’s to build a wall along the Mexican border). 
 220 See Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 868-69 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding 
California’s theft statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 484(a), overbroad and indivisible. This 
decision has the effect of eliminating convictions under this statute as serving as 
aggravated felonies); Vera-Valdevinos, 649 F. App’x at 597-99 (holding that Ariz. Rev. 
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reality, why not ask the normative question of whether this is in fact 
the better policy goal. I argue it is. Attaching immigration 
consequences to criminal convictions — in the over-inclusive manner 
that IIRIRA does based on convictions alone — is a project that will 
never succeed in reaching proportionality. Immigration law’s current 
reliance on convictions does not ascertain who is dangerous and who 
is not and errs by rendering inconsequential, minor crimes to be 
treated the same as serious ones. Instead of focusing just on offenders 
who are violent, the current scheme deems both a man who shoots a 
gun at a stranger to be as dangerous as a teenager who spat at a police 
officer during an arrest. Both can be convicted under an assault and 
battery statute that is deemed to be a crime of violence. But no rational 
criminal judge would mete out identical punishment for the offenders. 
It is time to return to an immigration system that effectively 
distinguishes between this conduct as well. 
In addition to expanding the number and types of crimes that have 
immigration consequences, IIRIRA eliminated second chances. Prior 
to 1990, Congress gave criminal courts authority to make a 
recommendation against deportation at criminal sentencing based on 
an assessment that neither the nature of the offense nor the character 
of the offender warranted such severe sanction. Prior to 1996, 
Congress gave immigration judges discretion to also give out second 
chances to those convicted of crimes if their equities outweighed any 
showing of harm, lack of remorse, or future dangerousness. The 
current experiment that denies second chances and expands the types 
of crimes that cause non-citizens to lose status has failed. Crimes do 
not effectively serve as proxies for character. Rather, immigration law 
must return to determining which non-citizens contribute to the 
country, their communities, and their families and which ones do not. 
Those determinations are based on numerous fact-specific factors and 
better separate out who is truly dangerous and who is not. The 
following Part thus outlines the problems arising from the current 
system, argues for the return to the pre-IIRIRA scheme whereby 
offenders were given individualized assessments of harm and reform, 
and responds to potential criticisms of reform. 
 
Stat. § 13–3408, which prohibits the possession, selling, manufacturing, 
administering, procuring, transporting, importing, and offering to transport a narcotic 
drug, is overbroad and indivisible). This decision is unpublished. However, once its 
analysis is published, it will have the impact of eliminating convictions under this 
statute as to both deportability grounds and aggravated felonies. 
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A. Relying on Criminal Convictions to Deport Non-Citizens Is 
Overinclusive, Disproportionate, Irrational, Inefficient, and Expensive 
Just as the prosecutors and federal courts are accepting the 
elimination of ACCA consequences so too are there compelling 
reasons not to accept criminal convictions as a rational basis to deny 
or take away immigration status. Contrary to the critiques of Descamps 
being the source of arbitrariness, it is IIRIRA’s underlying scheme that 
assigns consequences to a type of criminal conviction that leads to 
absurdity.221 Criminal law is designed to account for a range of 
conduct falling within a specific statute. Indeterminate sentencing, 
including probation and suspended sentences, permits criminal courts 
to impose sentences that match the seriousness of a specific 
defendant’s conduct. IIRIRA, however, no longer permits deference to 
criminal court findings, instead grading crimes by general categories 
than actual seriousness. Of note, the following four reasons stand out 
for criminal convictions as lacking proportionality with respect to 
immigration status. 
First, the current immigration law’s means of attaching 
consequences is crude and overinclusive. Since IIRIRA, the 
seriousness of a state offense is based on general categories — theft 
offense, crime of violence, controlled substance offense, etc. — rather 
than how criminal courts in fact viewed the crime. The problem with 
attaching consequences by categories is that a rapist who violently 
attacks strangers may be placed in the same category as a college 
student who urinates in public after drinking too much at a party. 
Both individuals have committed a sex offense, which depending on 
which state statute the conduct is prosecuted under, could fall within 
a crime of moral turpitude — a category that may both commence 
proceedings and bar particular remedies.222 As much as there is a 
 
 221 Stephen H. Legomsky eloquently made this argument in 1989, after Congress 
first made criminal grounds aggravated felonies in his article, Reforming the Criteria for 
the Exclusion and the Deportation of Alien Criminal Offenders, 12 DEF. ALIEN 64 (1989). 
This Article revives this argument in the current context that has revealed IIRIRA to 
be even more haphazard than the 1988 change that first started the trend to 
heightened criminalization of immigration law. 
 222 In Pannu v. Holder, a lawful permanent resident was convicted under California 
Penal Code § 314.1 of misdemeanor indecent exposure. Pannu v. Holder, 639 F.3d 
1225, 1226 (9th Cir. 2011). This crime prohibits a person who “exposes his person, or 
the private parts therefore, in any public place, or in any place where there are present 
other persons to be offended or annoyed thereby.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (2017). 
A second conviction constitutes a felony under this provision and requires individuals 
to register as sex offenders under California Penal Code section 290(c). See Pannu, 
639 F.3d at 1226; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290(C), 314. In Pannu, the lawful 
  
2017] The Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation 2131 
compelling argument to exclude dangerous rapists, it is harder to 
exclude a drunken college student based on the same reasoning. 
Second, IIRIRA made changes that elide the sentencing 
considerations that a criminal court imposed. Even if charged with the 
same statute, a criminal court has the means to sentence a rapist to a 
much longer period of incarceration than the college student who 
exposed himself in public. But IIRIRA does not consider that 
difference when attaching consequences to a crime. 
IIRIRA makes a notable mistake in determining that, when defining 
some crimes aggravated felonies, the seriousness of particular crimes is 
based on whether a court imposed a sentence of “one year or more,” 
which means 365 days or more. Congress was most likely trying to 
draw the line between a felony and a misdemeanor and wanting to 
classify the felonies as aggravated felonies. IIRIRA, however, collapsed 
this distinction through inartful drafting. Regardless, the problem is 
that most states and the federal government draw the line at a sentence 
of “more than a year,” meaning 366 days.223 As a consequence, the 
actual distinction of felonies from misdemeanors is missing when 
classifying certain crimes as aggravated felonies. As said above, crimes 
that are considered aggravated felonies no longer need to be 
aggravated nor felonies. 
Third, in a related error, IIRIRA also refuses to take into account 
actual, instead of potential, sentences. In California, manslaughter can 
be punished by probation or an eleven-year prison term.224 In 
 
permanent resident was arrested a second time for indecent exposure and subject to 
mandatory requirements to register as a sex offender under California Penal Code 
§ 290(c). See Pannu, 639 F.3d at 1226. His failure to do so was a misdemeanor offense. 
Id. The IJ and BIA found that Mr. Pannu’s convictions under section 314.1 were 
categorically CIMTs. Id. at 1227. In Pannu, the Ninth Circuit took issue with the BIA’s 
analysis and remanded the issue for reconsideration. Id. at 1229. The facts underlying 
Pannu’s initial conviction are unknown but would encompass the college student 
hypothetical. Moreover, even if the BIA reverses course in the Ninth Circuit, it is free 
to assert its finding in all other circuits. See In re Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 
478, 478 (B.I.A. 2015) (explaining how immigration courts apply the law of the 
circuit in which they are located). For a compelling argument that the category of 
CIMTs is unconstitutionally vague, see generally Holper, supra note 46.  
 223 This too is a misnomer as some states draw the line between felonies and 
misdemeanors at two-year rather than one-year sentences. 
 224 By statute, “Voluntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in the state 
prison for 3, 6, or 11 years.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 193 (2011). However, a defendant 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter may petition for a judge to “reduce [the 
conviction] to involuntary manslaughter and if the judge after so doing grants the 
motion, then to entertain her application for probation.” People v. Doyle, 328 P.2d 7, 
11 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (2017) (listing 
conditions under which a defendant may be eligible and ineligible for this request). 
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Montana, rape is prosecuted by a sentencing range of two to one 
hundred years.225 A criminal court is directed to impose a term that 
reflects the seriousness of the criminal conduct. And it does so, using 
surgical precision to determine which offender is serious and a risk to 
the community and which one was simply reckless or stupid. IIRIRA 
fails to follow this grading, often relying on potential sentences to be 
as serious as an actual one that a sentencing court imposed.226 
Treating all crimes the same under immigration law, without regard to 
the individual circumstances that mitigated or aggravated a sentence, 
serves an efficiency purpose but not one born of common sense. 
Fourth, IIRIRA no longer permits established rehabilitation and 
reform to matter. State courts permit individuals who later establish 
rehabilitation or reform to expunge or vacate their convictions. Under 
state law, a juvenile adjudication, an expunged conviction, a vacated 
conviction, and a pardoned one are deemed to no longer exist. 
A person can truthfully state that he or she was not convicted under 
these circumstances, which prevents exposure to the up to 50,000 
collateral consequences that can attach in the numerous contexts of 
housing, employment, and education. Prior to IIRIRA, immigration 
law took juvenile adjudications, and expunged and vacated 
convictions into account and would not attach consequences to 
them.227 
 
 225 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (2015) (“A person convicted of sexual 
intercourse without consent shall be punished by life imprisonment or by 
imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not less than 2 years or more than 100 
years . . . .”). Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1 (2017) (felony where maximum 
sentence is more than two years) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (2017) (sentence of 
more than one year).  
  226 See Alberto-Gonzalez v. INS, 215 F.3d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Further, 
while Congress used the phrase ‘for which the term of imprisonment is one year’ in 
some sections of section 1101(a)(43), in other sections, Congress explicitly provided 
that the term to consider is the sentence that may be imposed.” (emphasis in 
original)) (comparing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), (P), (R), (S) with 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101(a)(43)(J), (T)); Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(“That Lopez–Elias’s four-year sentence was suspended is of no significance, for 
IIRIRA makes plain that ‘[a]ny reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with 
respect to an offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement 
ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution 
of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(48)(B))). 
 227 See Resendiz-Alcaraz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 383 F.3d 1262, 1266-68, 1271 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (in a break from prior immigration law, “a state conviction is a conviction 
for immigration purposes, regardless of whether it is later expunged under a state 
rehabilitative statute, so long as it satisfies the requirements of § 1101(a)(48)(A)”); 
Vieira Garcia v. INS, 239 F.3d 409, 412 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The BIA stated that ‘[i]n 
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In a marked departure from prior law, IIRIRA no longer recognizes 
expungements, commuted sentences, vacated sentences, and other 
extraordinary relief — including some pardons — that states have 
given to those worthy of second chances.228 Continuing to recognize a 
conviction that the originating court no longer recognizes is not a 
rational approach to sorting out those who are a continuing danger to 
the community from those who are not. In 1996, at the height of the 
Tough on Crime movement, there was no desire to do so. But, 
proportionality demands grading offenses and offenders by their 
seriousness. 
Fifth, because immigration law is civil, the collateral consequences 
of criminal convictions are retroactive.229 The categorical retroactivity 
reveals a further lack of fit with rehabilitation. In Tyson v. Holder, 
 
passing this legislation [the IIRIRA], Congress could have, but did not, exclude 
juvenile offenses . . . .’ The BIA also commented on the legislative history of the 
IIRIRA, noting that the definition of conviction was deliberately broadened beyond 
that of the prior definition.”). 
 228 See Balogun v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 425 F.3d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Balogun 
argues that he is entitled to a waiver of his inadmissible status under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(v) because he ‘has been granted a full and unconditional pardon . . . 
by the Governor of any of the several States.’ The government responds that Balogun’s 
new pardon is not ‘full and unconditional’ because, while all his civil and political 
rights under state law were restored, he is still subject to the federal consequences of 
his federal embezzlement convictions (for example, federal felon in possession laws 
and federal habitual offender laws). Although we are inclined to agree with the BIA, 
we need not decide what Congress intended by ‘full and unconditional pardon’ 
because Balogun is ineligible for the pardon-waiver provision of section 
1227(a)(2)(A)(v) in any event.”); Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (B.I.A. 2003) 
(“In accord with the federal court opinions applying [IIRIRA’s] definition of a 
conviction at section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, we find that there is a significant 
distinction between convictions vacated on the basis of a procedural or substantive 
defect in the underlying proceedings and those vacated because of post-conviction 
events, such as rehabilitation or immigration hardships. Thus, if a court with 
jurisdiction vacates a conviction based on a defect in the underlying criminal 
proceedings, the respondent no longer has a ‘conviction’ within the meaning of 
section 101(a)(48)(A). If, however, a court vacates a conviction for reasons unrelated 
to the merits of the underlying criminal proceedings, the respondent remains 
‘convicted’ for immigration purposes.”). 
 229 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 290 (2001). In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held 
that IIRIRA’s reclassification of crimes as aggravated felonies was permissible as long 
as defendants who pled guilty to pre-1996 crimes would receive the benefit of the pre-
IIRIRA’s remedies that potentially forgave those crimes in individualized hearings. See 
id. at 326. It was not until 2012, that the Ninth Circuit extended the protections of the 
pre-1996 remedies to those who also had had a bench trial. See Tyson v. Holder, 670 
F.3d 1015, 1016 (9th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court extended additional protections 
to lawful permanent residents by also extending the reentry rules in effect at the time 
of their conviction to them. See Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1491-93 (2012). 
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when a lawful permanent resident was twenty-eight years old, she 
entered the country and was found to have $350 worth of heroin in 
her possession.230 In 1980, when she had a bench trial, the federal 
judge did not sustain a more serious charge of possession with intent 
to distribute, finding that the conduct was intended for personal 
consumption.231 He did, however, sustain the charge of importation. 
At the time, Ms. Tyson had been a lawful permanent resident for three 
years, and her offense, which was the importation of heroin, had no 
immigration consequences. Indeed, this conviction was sustained 
eight years before Congress even created the category of aggravated 
felonies and sixteen years before IIRIRA expanded the category to 
include this conviction. Ms. Tyson thus retained her green card, and 
built her life in the United States, which included raising two citizen 
children and making monetary and volunteering contributions to the 
local schools and community organizations. 
In 2005, Ms. Tyson travelled abroad, which brought her to the 
attention of immigration authorities. She was placed in removal 
proceedings, charged with an aggravated felony, and ordered 
removed.232 
Although Ms. Tyson prevailed on a technical matter on her appeal, 
applying consequences to remote crimes, after the individual has 
decades of rehabilitation and contributions, is difficult to understand. 
Attaching immigration consequences to criminal convictions, by its 
innate operation, sweeps in individuals who are not a present or future 
danger. 
Sixth, using crimes as proxies for desirable immigrants is also 
proven to be an expensive, inefficient use of resources. The Secure 
Communities program, run from 2008 to 2014, and its current 
formulation called Priority Enforcement Program, has been met with 
much criticism.233 These programs ask cities, counties, and states to 
 
 230 Tyson, 670 F.3d at 1016. 
 231 Id. at 1016-17. 
 232 Id. at 1017. 
 233 Many scholars have provided excellent and thorough discussions of the 
concerns arising from immigration detention practices. See, e.g., Ming H. Chen, Trust 
in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After Secure 
Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13 (2016) (a neutral assessment of the issue but 
noting the criticisms made by cities and localities in the operation Secure 
Communities); Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination, supra note 32, at 
1014-19, 1037 (discussing racial disparities in crime-based removals); Juliet P. 
Stumpf, D(E)volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure Communities, 
64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1261-65 (2015) (discussing the myriad criticisms of Secure 
Communities and discussing whether PEP can avoid them). See generally Phillip L. 
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run background checks on all whom they arrest to identify non-
citizens.234 Those who are not citizens are placed in immigration 
detention under an immigration officer or judge determines if their 
crimes warrant removal. 
Although the government heralds this system as valuable in 
identifying, detaining, and removing criminal aliens, critics have been 
less kind. Critics point to the ineffectual nature of sweeping in non-
dangerous individuals. Under this program, in 2016, the government 
is contracted to pay for the detention of 34,000 each day (410,000 a 
year) at a cost of approximately $5.05 million a day (totaling over 
$2 billion a year).235 Of those detained, 40% did not have any criminal 
conviction (either due to dismissed charges or acquittals) and another 
16% committed minor crimes, such as a parent driving without a 
license who was arrested when dropping off their child at school. 
According to studies by Professor Ingrid Eagly, a sizeable number of 
“criminal aliens” (a term that does not differentiate between those 
with and without legal status) who were removed under the auspice of 
crime-based removals in fact had been brought to the attention of the 
authorities due to traffic violations.236 Indeed, among those detained, 
it is estimated that fewer than ten percent were actually convicted of 
violent crimes.237 Despite the rhetoric of protecting the public from 
harm, the reality appears that taxpayers have spent billions of dollars 
 
Torrey, Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics, Profit, and the 
Meaning of Custody, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879, 897-906 (2015) (criticizing private 
prisons, their profits, and their lobbying influence in operating immigrant detention 
centers). 
 234 Stumpf, supra note 233, at 1268-69 (“Ordinarily after booking an individual, 
police submit the arrestee’s fingerprint information to Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(FBI) and DHS databases to search for outstanding warrants. Secure Communities’ 
innovation was to send matching fingerprints to ICE for comparison with immigration 
databases and a determination whether to seek custody of the arrested individual. 
Immigration agents had already started entering civil immigration warrants into these 
databases, resulting in state and local arrests both for crimes and civil immigration 
violations. Secure Communities took advantage of these databases in a different way 
and used them to check all arrestees across the nation to identify removable 
noncitizens.”). 
 235 Sharita Gruberg, How For-Profit Companies Are Driving Detention Policies, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 18, 2015, 9:29 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/immigration/report/2015/12/18/127769/how-for-profit-companies-are-driving-
immigration-detention-policies. 
 236 Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local 
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1218 (2013). 
 237 Gruberg, supra note 235. For a strong criticism of immigration detention 
policies see generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration 
Imprisonment, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1449 (2015). 
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to remove those with non-existent crimes, minor offenses, or traffic 
violations. 
Those who did benefit — and continue to benefit — from this 
program have been the private prisons who run nine of the ten largest 
immigration detention centers and two out of every three immigration 
detention centers.238 These private corporations enter contracts 
guaranteeing payment regardless of whether the existing 34,000 beds 
are actually filled.239 In August 2016, the Obama administration 
announced its intent to phase out the use of private prisons to detain 
criminal offenders because private prisons “simply do not provide the 
same level of correctional services, programs, and resources; they do 
not save substantially on costs; and as noted in a recent report by the 
Department’s Office of Inspector General, they do not maintain the 
same level of safety and security.”240 Despite these concerns in the 
criminal context, in November 2016, the Obama administration 
recommended increasing the use of immigration detention, including 
the use of facilities that were deemed unsafe for use in criminal 
detention.241 In October 2016, the number of detained non-citizens 
increased to over 40,000 with 47,000 planned for summer of 2017.242 
 
 238 Gruberg, supra note 235 (reporting that for-profit prisons run 62% of 
immigration detention centers and 8.4% of state and federal prisons); Erica 
Hellerstein, A Shocking Glimpse Inside America’s Privatized Detention Facilities for 
Immigrants, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 10, 2016), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/ 
2016/03/10/3757575/secretive-world-of-privatized-immigrant-detention (reporting 
that 9 out of the 10 largest detention centers are privately run); see also Chico Harlan, 
Inside the Administration’s $1 Billion Deal to Detain Central American Asylum Seekers, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ 
inside-the-administrations-1-billion-deal-to-detain-central-american-asylum-seekers/ 
2016/08/14/e47f1960-5819-11e6-9aee-8075993d73a2_story.html (reporting that a 
four year, $1 billion contract to the private Corrections Corporation of America is a 
“boon for CAA, which in an unusual arrangement, gets the money regardless of how 
many people are detained at the facility”). 
 239 Immigration Detention 101, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, https://www. 
detentionwatchnetwork.org/issues/detention-101 (last visited Mar. 24, 2017) (“The 
system also operates under a congressionally mandated quota that requires ICE to 
maintain 34,000 detention beds at any given time. This policy, known as the detention 
bed quota, is unprecedented; no other law enforcement agency operates on a quota 
system.”); see also Immigration Detention Map and Statistics, CIVIC ENDISOLATION, 
http://www.endisolation.org/resources/immigration-detention (last visited Mar. 24, 
2017) (interactive map about current detention facilities based on government data). 
 240 Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., to the Acting Director, 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/ 
886311/download; see also Julia Zorthian, Justice Department Will Stop the Use of 
Private Prisons, TIME.COM (Aug. 18, 2016, 3:02 PM), http://time.com/4457597/private-
prisons-justice-department. 
 241 New SPLC Report Uncovers Abuse and Neglect at Immigrant Detention Centers in 
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A more recent problem of this program is that even when non-
citizens are found to have relevant convictions, after being fed and 
housed in detention, removal does not happen because countries are 
refusing to accept the deportees.243 The countries “often refuse to take 
individuals identified for deportation because of a lack of proper 
identification, problems in confirming citizenship, or poor record-
keeping.”244 
Seventh, the expense of processing the current number of non-
citizens with criminal convictions is costly. For those who are 
detained, based on numbers from 2016, the annual cost to the 
taxpayer at the rate of 34,000 beds (used by the 440,600 immigrants 
who are detained annually) is over $2 billion each year.245 
But for the vast majority of those who are and are not detained, most 
are entitled to hearings before an immigration judge. Currently 
immigration courts are at a breaking point, requiring an average two-
 
the South, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/news/ 
2016/11/21/new-splc-report-uncovers-abuse-and-neglect-immigrant-detention-
centers-south (“In the wake of the DOJ decision, the DHS announced it would also re-
examine its use of privatized immigration facilities. But the agency quickly renewed or 
finalized contracts for thousands of additional beds. The agency has also expanded the 
number of individuals it plans to detain every night by 10,000 people — pushing the 
total number of detainees to an estimated 45,000 people. What’s more, the agency’s 
new contracts include a facility — the Cibola County Correctional Center in Milan, 
New Mexico — that lost its contract with the DOJ after reports of abuse and medical 
neglect. The DHS’s actions suggest that the private prisons no longer used by the DOJ, 
including some of the worst in the country, could simply become immigration 
detention centers.”); see also Hanna Kozlowska, The American Private Prison Industry 
Has Scored Another Big Win with the US Government, QUARTZ (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://qz.com/850810/the-department-of-homeland-security-wants-to-keep-using-
private-prisons-for-immigration-detention/ (“In October [2016], ICE was holding 
more than 40,000 people in detention, more than ever before, the Wall Street Journal 
reported.”). 
 242 Kozlowska, supra note 241 (“The agency is projected to be detaining as many as 
47,000 immigrants by June 2017.”). 
 243 Ron Nixon, Nations Hinder U.S. Effort to Deport Immigrants Convicted of Crime, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/us/homeland-security-
immigrants-criminal-conviction.html (citing government statistics showing 8,000 
non-citizens — both undocumented and lawful permanent residents — who have 
been released from detention based on their native countries’ refusal to accept their 
return). 
 244 Id. In addition, some countries subject those with criminal convictions to 
inhumane conditions, some rising to torture, because of the stigma and fear of U.S. 
deportees who have criminal convictions. See Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907, 909 
(9th Cir. 2012) (remanding case for BIA to reconsider evidence that Haitian 
authorities engaged in systematic means to torture returning U.S. deportees with 
criminal convictions). 
 245 Gruberg, supra note 235.  
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year-wait to adjudicate approximately 500,000 cases each year.246 
Some cities are experiencing an eight-year delay in scheduling cases.247 
For decades, Congress has rejected repeated requests to hire 
immigration judges, provide them with staff, and reduce their 
unwieldy case load — averaging 4,000 cases each year — to reduce the 
delay.248 
The hearings are not mere technicalities. Over 50% of those who 
appear at these hearings have a legal means to remain in the United 
States — either as an asylee or lawful permanent resident.249 The 
current system then is operating at an enormous cost that has the end 
of providing legal status to more than half of those who are detained 
and placed in proceedings. 
 
 246 See Julia Preston, Deluged Immigration Courts, Where Cases Stall for Years, Begin 
to Buckle, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/us/deluged-
immigration-courts-where-cases-stall-for-years-begin-to-buckle.html (“Weighed down 
by a backlog of more than 520,000 cases, the United States immigration courts are 
foundering, increasingly failing to deliver timely, fair decisions to people fighting 
deportation or asking for refuge, according to interviews with lawyers, judges and 
government officials. With too few judges, overworked clerks and an antiquated 
docket based on stacks of paper files, many of the 56 courts nationwide have become 
crippled by delays and bureaucratic breakdowns.”). 
 247 Ronica Cleary, Arlington Immigration Court Cases Being Scheduled as Far out as 
2024, FOX 5 (Sept. 1, 2016, 7:30 PM), http://www.fox5dc.com/news/local-news/ 
199158534-story. 
 248 Stephanie Mencimer, Why Our Immigration Courts Can’t Handle the Child 
Migrant Crisis, MOTHER JONES (Jul. 14, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www. 
motherjones.com/politics/2014/07/immigration-courts-backlog-child-migrant-crisis 
(reporting on repeated denials of funding to hire more immigration judges, while the 
backlog has more than doubled during the past ten years); see also Kari E. Hong, 
Famigration (Fam-Imm): The Next Frontier in Immigration Law, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 
63, 72-73, 72-74 nn.29–36 (2014) (citing to statistics, reports, scholars, and 
immigration judges who report on the delay arising from “immigration judges who are 
overworked, understaffed”). In addition, the immigration courts are unique in that 
they do not have separation from the prosecutors who appear in front of them and 
have been fired for issuing decisions that were perceived as too favorable towards non-
citizens. See id. at 73-74 & nn.34–35. 
 249 See Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, AM. 
IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/ 
research/access-counsel-immigration-court. Based on data from 2007 to 2012, 53% of 
all non-citizens facing removal proceedings during that period were granted relief, 
totaling just 144,544 out of 272,352 cases decided. The report documents that there is 
a significant disparity in grant rates based on whether the applicant does or does not 
have counsel, which unlike criminal law, is not guaranteed in immigration 
proceedings. But there are states that are attempting to provide legal assistance to non-
citizens. See Octavio Blanco, New York To Provide Lawyers for Immigrants Facing 
Deportation, CNN MONEY (Apr. 13, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/13/news/ 
economy/new-york-immigrant-legal-defense-fund/. 
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B. The Immigration Law Should Return to Permit Individual 
Assessments of Offenses and Offenders Rather than Base Deportation on 
the Existence of Convictions 
IIRIRA’s reliance on categories of crimes and sentences as proxies 
for dangerousness and undesirability has been an unsuccessful project. 
By its very operation, attempting to assign blameworthiness through 
convictions does not reach proportional ends. IIRIRA fails to account 
for how serious the criminal courts deemed the initial crime and fails 
to account for any rehabilitation that occurs — both recognized by 
state courts and in real life. The absurdity in results does not arise 
from Descamps. Rather, the absurdity is found in the underlying 
IIRIRA scheme that attempts to collapse disparate convictions into 
categories deserving of the same punishment in immigration law. 
In this respect, I join the call others have made in repealing the 
failed approach that IIRIRA took with respect to using criminal 
convictions to increase crime-based deportation.250 
In 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA and fundamentally altered the 
way by which immigration violations were expanded to include 
numerous crimes. As others have catalogued, in the first 100 years of 
our nation — from 1789 to 1875 — Congress was not particularly 
active in excluding or deporting non-citizens on any basis, mostly due 
to state governments taking on this function and the lack of national 
infrastructure to effectuate any policy goals.251 Beginning in 1875, 
Congress began to pass legislation to exclude certain nationals from 
entry into the country if they had specific criminal convictions. 
Targeting Chinese and Japanese nationals, “Congress first passed a 
statute barring convicts and prostitutes from entering the country.”252 
In 1917 — during a period of national isolationism — Congress 
expanded immigration policy to also take away status from those who 
committed particular crimes within the United States borders.253 The 
 
 250 See generally sources cited supra note 32. 
 251 Compare Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (citing GORDON & H. 
ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.(2)(a), 5 (1959), for the proposition 
of the era of unregulated federal immigration), with Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost 
Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1833-34 
(1993) (“This pervasive myth asserts that the borders of the United States were legally 
open until the enactment of federal immigration legislation in the 1870s and 
1880s. . . . Nonetheless, the borders were not legally open. Regulation of transborder 
movement of persons existed, primarily at the state level, but also supplemented by 
federal legislation.”). 
 252 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477). 
 253 Id. (citing Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. 301, 29 Stat. 874 (Feb. 5, 1917)). 
Even though the law provided for deportation, Congress did not create a formal or 
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deportable offenses were limited to either multiple convictions 
involving moral turpitude or a singular conviction involving moral 
turpitude for which a sentence of one year or more was served, and 
the crimes occurred within five years of the non-citizens’ admission.254 
For the next eighty years, using criminal convictions to exclude and 
deport non-citizens was not widespread. In this time period, crime-
related deportations accounted for seven percent of all deportations.255 
As mentioned in Part I, during the Tough on Crime era, 1988 
ushered a dramatic change to immigration law, which cumulated with 
IIRIRA’s current conception of numerous, non-violent, misdemeanor, 
and expunged offenses serving as a basis for inadmissibility, 
deportability, and aggravated felonies.256 Not surprising the number of 
crime-based removals since 1988 increased from 20% in 1986, 50% in 
1995, and currently 59% for all deportations in 2015.257 Such a rate is 
particularly notable given that not only has President Obama’s 2.5 
million deportations been the most that any president has overseen, 
but that amount exceeds the total combined number of deportations 
that occurred under nineteen presidents from 1892 to 2000.258 
 
systemized means to do so until the 1940s under the auspices of the Department of 
Justice. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 387-88 (2006). 
 254 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361. This provision remains part of the immigration law at 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).  
 255 Legomsky, supra note 32, at 488 n.92 (“From 1908 through 1986 there were 
large fluctuations, but, for that era as a whole, approximately 7% of all deportations 
were on crime-related post-entry grounds.”). 
 256 See supra Part I.A. 
 257 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., ICE 
ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 3 (2015) (“ICE has continued to 
increase its focus on identifying, arresting, and removing convicted criminals in 
prisons and jails, and also at-large arrests in the interior. In FY 2015, ICE sustained 
the improved quality of its removals by focusing on serious public safety and national 
security threats. ICE increased the percentage of removals of convicted criminal by 3 
percent over FY 2014. In FY 2015, ICE removed 139,368 convicted criminals, which 
represented 59 percent of total ICE removals.”); Legomsky, supra note 32, at 489 n.93 
(citing statistics for 1986, 1993, 1994, and 1995). 
 258 Tim Rogers, Obama Has Deported More Immigrants than Any Other President. 
Now He’s Running up the Score, FUSION (Jan. 7, 2016, 5:35 PM), 
http://fusion.net/story/252637/obama-has-deported-more-immigrants-than-any-other-
president-now-hes-running-up-the-score (“Since coming to office in 2009, Obama’s 
government has deported more than 2.5 million people — up 23% from the 
George W. Bush years. More shockingly, Obama is now on pace to deport more 
people than the sum of all 19 presidents who governed the United States from 
1892–2000, according to government data.”). 
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After twenty years of IIRIRA’s scheme, many have accepted the 
premise that crimes should be a basis to exclude and remove non-
citizens. But this scheme is an aberration from our history. As 
Descamps is revealing, collateral consequences for prior convictions 
appears to be entirely unnecessary and arbitrary when implemented in 
practice. 
Moreover, this scheme’s failure — described in Part II and Part III 
— that results in overinclusive and arbitrary outcomes arises because 
IIRIRA does not distinguish serious crimes from non-serious ones. To 
use prior examples, a drunk college student who urinates is treated the 
same as a rapist and child molester. Immigration law used to be able to 
distinguish between these two individuals by using the prior 
mechanisms. 
First, in 1917, when Congress first created crimes as a basis for 
immigration violations, it did so by introducing the JRAD, which 
permitted a criminal court to make a binding recommendation against 
deportation. This extended to state and federal courts who were the 
ones evaluating what criminal punishment was appropriate for the 
offender and offense. Such power is critical as the criminal court judge 
has the best vantage point to assess the seriousness of the offense and 
dangerousness of the offender. In 1990, amid the Tough on Crime era, 
Congress eliminated JRAD.259 It did so without providing reason or 
reflection for doing so.260 The repeal of JRAD is a significant loss in the 
check on absurd results. Its absence prevents the criminal court from 
ensuring that non-serious crimes and non-dangerous offenders are not 
deported. 
Second, the immigration courts no longer have the authority to 
make individualized determinations before criminal convictions have 
consequences. Prior to IIRIRA, Congress gave defenses to deportations 
— such as suspension of deportation and section 212(c) relief — that 
permitted immigration courts and officers to weigh the facts of an 
offense against the character and circumstances of the non-citizen. 
This process provided an opportunity for an immigration court to 
evaluate a crime and defendant before imposing consequences.261 The 
 
 259 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050. 
 260 See Cade, supra note 47, at 40 n.17. Professor Cade provides an excellent 
discussion of the JRAD and reasons for its return in this essay. 
 261 In 1996, Congress eliminated the immigration remedy known as “Section 
212(c)” relief. Section 212(c) referred to the code in the INA that was a remedy for 
LPRs who had committed crimes. The LPR appeared before the immigration judge, 
and that one immigration judge would look at the nature of the crime and whether 
any rehabilitation had occurred. The immigration judge would also consider the non-
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authority was far reaching because criminal convictions that now 
commence proceedings and bar remedies, including those classified as 
aggravated felonies, were often forgiven under these schemes. A 
person was given only one second chance, but for those who were 
reformed and rehabilitated, that second chance prevented the 
imposition of hardship on citizen children, spouses, relatives, 
neighbors, and community members that benefited from their 
documented contributions. 
In this respect, the call for reform is not simply a repeal of IIRIRA’s 
expansion of crimes as having relevance under immigration law. But 
the reform must also restore the legal mechanisms by which judges 
were able to make individual determinations on whether a person was 
dangerous or rehabilitated. 
C. Responses to Potential Criticisms 
Those in support of the status quo may argue that this proposal 
overlooks that the aggressive removal of criminal aliens has worked in 
keeping down crime rates. Any policy that returns criminals into 
society runs the risk of hurting citizens. But this response errs in 
assuming immigration policy has the means to effectuate reform that 
the criminal justice system does not. If someone is a continuing 
danger to society after committing a crime, the criminal justice system 
has the means to incapacitate them from harming another through 
lengthy sentences, life terms, and capital punishment. Immigration 
law — as a civil matter — has no role in this determination or 
execution. 
Likewise, to the extent that immigration law is being sought to 
prevent crime, it is not an effective means to do so. Nationally, 76.6% 
of prisoners commit a crime within five years of release.262 Even the 
most critical of studies place the recidivism rate for non-citizens at 
under half that rate.263 The mass incarceration problem is being 
 
citizen’s equities, which were defined to include family ties to U.S. citizens or LPRs, 
length of residence in the United States, employment history, service to the 
community, and other factors that demonstrated their inter-connectedness to the 
community. As noted in St. Cyr, Section 212(c) cases were granted at a national rate of 
at least 51.5%. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 n.5 (2001). 
 262 Office of Justice Programs, Recidivism, NAT’L INST. JUST. (June 17, 2014), 
http://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism/pages/welcome.aspx (compiling data 
from 404,638 prisoners in 30 states after their release in 2005). 
 263 Maria Sacchetti, Criminal Immigrants Reoffend at Higher Rates than ICE Has 
Suggested, BOS. GLOBE (June 4, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/ 
2016/06/04/criminal-immigrants-reoffend-higher-rates-than-ice-has-suggested/ 
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addressed in myriad ways through various national and local 
measures.264 Among the more salient reforms to prevent recidivism are 
shorter sentences, alternative sentencing programs for first offenders, 
and rehabilitation measures. When states and the federal government 
are tasked with stopping recidivism, immigration status has not once 
been on the list of innovative programs or measures.265 Outside of 
anti-immigration rhetoric, there has been no documented correlation, 
let alone causation, that immigration status has on current or future 
crime. To the extent that criminal reform needs to occur, the criminal 
justice system is better suited to redress the needs of the offender. 
Using immigration law to punish or prevent crime is not borne out to 
be of value to this process. 
A second criticism that may arise is that the good old days may look 
better now than they did in 1996. But this overlooks the facts that 
criminal convictions were not crude, overinclusive mechanisms that 
resulted in automatic deportation, regardless of how much a loss of a 
non-citizen was to his or her citizen children, spouse, or community. 
Advocates had a system to contend that lawful permanent residents 
who committed minor crimes could not lose status for that reason and 
undocumented individuals — if they had ties to citizen family 
members, were needed by U.S. employers, or were afraid to return to 
their country — could contribute if their value outweighed the crime. 
Weighing individual equities and providing second opportunities is 
not mere nostalgia but the reflection of a nuanced and compassionate 
immigration enforcement system. 
Moreover, the experiment in ratcheting up crime-based deportation 
was not a thoughtful, considered proposal to an existing problem. 
Instead, IIRIRA was at best a political calculation by each party to woo 
voters who were concerned with the optics of being tough on 
immigration along with being tough on crime, welfare fraud, and gay 
marriages. IIRIRA was part of legislation authored by a Republican 
Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton in a now-infamous two-
month period that was weeks before his reelection. On August 22, 
 
l0OpCWfTdCuTNLIAfxApAO/story.html (criticizing ICE practices and noting that 
“[t]he review does not indicate that immigrants are any more likely to commit crimes 
than native-born Americans — and in fact studies have shown that not to be the 
case”). In addition, according to their study: just 30% of non-citizens reoffend, which 
is half the recidivism rate of Massachusetts (60%) and quite a bit less than the national 
average (76%). Id.  
 264 See the Smart on Crime and reentry programs listed at supra text accompanying 
notes 196–98. 
 265 See the Smart on Crime and reentry programs listed at supra text accompanying 
notes 196–98. 
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1996, President Clinton ended welfare by signing the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act,266 and in early September 
1996, he signed the Defense of Marriage Act, a law later found 
constitutional at the time to defend heterosexual marriages from the 
threat of same-sex marriages.267 In that very same month, on 
September 30, 1996 in an election year, President Clinton also signed 
IIRIRA.268 
IIRIRA is a product of its time — one that many now recognize to 
have produced policy based on bad impulses rather than considered 
evidence. Three other laws signed during that time — the 1994 Crime 
Bill, DOMA, and welfare reform — have since been renounced for 
substituting hysteria for policy and in the case of DOMA, declared 
unconstitutional. Of import, these other laws have been recognized as 
being birthed by political calculations rather than meaningful political 
reform.269 
 
 266 “By 1996, Clinton was running for reelection and comprehensive welfare reform 
legislation was moving through in Congress. Named the ‘Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act,’ the bill truly ended welfare as we knew it. Although Gingrich’s 
orphanages were nowhere to be seen, the legislation ended the welfare entitlement, a 
heretofore sixty-year federal guarantee that all poor people who qualified would receive the 
benefit. It instituted work requirements and limited the number of years parents could 
receive welfare over their lifetimes. AFDC would be replaced by a program termed 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).” Margaret O’Mara, Welfare as We Knew 
It: The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, BLACKPAST.ORG, 
http://www.blackpast.org/perspectives/welfare-we-knew-it-1996-personal-responsibility-
and-work-opportunity-act (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) (discussing political calculations that 
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Poverty: Welfare Reform — from Bad to Worse, NATION (Mar. 9, 2012), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/week-poverty-welfare-reform-bad-worse. 
 267 Steve Kornacki, Why Bill Clinton Really Signed DOMA, MSNBC (Oct. 27, 2015, 
3:19 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/why-bill-clinton-really-signed-doma (“A 
profile in courage moment? Hardly. But a coldly rational judgment from a politician 
who had gotten too far ahead of the public on gay rights and paid dearly for it?”).  
 268 See Carrie Johnson, 20 Years Later, Parts of Major Crime Bill Viewed As Terrible 
Mistake, NPR (Sept. 12, 2014, 3:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/12/347736999/ 
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8:40 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11515132/iirira-clinton-immigration. 
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than to be driven by the facts”); Kornacki, supra note 267 (explaining President 
Clinton’s calculus in signing the bill: “A profile in courage moment? Hardly. But a 
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Rothman, Why Bill Clinton Signed the Welfare Reform Bill, as Explained in 1996, 
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IIRIRA’s desire to be tough on immigration and tough on crime then 
arose from the same impulses that are now recognized as not 
responding to real problems and creating untold harms.270 Indeed, one 
pundit’s current explanation as to why President Clinton signed 
IIRIRA is “essentially, that on some level the Clinton administration 
really did want to look tough on immigration. And that was more 
important than vetoing a bill because some in the administration 
didn’t like its policy provisions.”271 
IIRIRA’s unprecedented crackdown on non-citizens who commit 
crimes, then, did not arise from an identified harm or part of a desired 
solution. Instead, it was merely craven politics instead of rationality. 
At the time, using a larger number and types of crimes to exclude and 
deport non-citizens was unnecessary and inhumane. Instead of 
focusing on which non-citizens contributed to the country, served the 
military, or provided for citizen family members, a criminal conviction 
was enough to end their status and residence in this country. In the 
twenty years since IIRIRA, its enforcement has also proven expensive 
— in the form of billions of dollars spent on detention — and 
inefficient — in clogging up overburdened courts with cases that prior 
to IIRIRA, involved either offenses too minor to be deportable offenses 
or filled with equities too compelling to ignore. The continued 
operation of an irrational system that was produced by political 
calculations is no longer tenable. 
CONCLUSION 
At first blush, Descamps and Mathis are highly technical decisions 
relating to a highly complicated field. But they arrive when society, 
prosecutors, the courts, and policy makers are engaged in larger 
conversations over the myriad contributors to mass incarceration in 
general and whether the costs of collateral consequences to crimes 
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outweigh their benefits. It is impossible to view the impact of these 
cases in isolation. Mathis and Descamps, in a faithful adherence to 
jurisprudence, will be reducing and eliminating numerous offenses 
from having ACCA and IIRIRA consequences. In the ACCA context, 
prosecutors are embracing this result by permitting those impacted to 
be resentenced to shorter terms. In August 2016, the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission recommended that Congress eliminate all drug offenses 
as being subjected to ACCA. 
This Article calls on the same normative result to be embraced in 
the immigration context. Upon examination, IIRIRA’s reliance on 
crimes to serve as immigration grounds is too arbitrary and out of 
proportion to how the criminal courts considered the seriousness (or 
lack thereof) of the crime. The problem with relying on criminal 
convictions to determine which non-citizens can remain, and which 
ones must leave the United States, is that they sweep in such a breadth 
of conduct that they do not serve as effective proxies for 
dangerousness and desirability. Regulating immigration in an effective 
and meaningfully way is hampered when people are classified by 
criminal categories in lieu of individualized determinations of benefit 
and harm. The federal courts are restoring common sense and 
proportionality by eliminating immigration consequences for crimes. 
This presents an opportunity for Congress to follow suit, repeal 
IIRIRA, and restore proportionality and common sense to immigration 
enforcement. 
Much will be written about the Trump administration’s heightened 
immigration enforcement efforts. But President Trump is not their 
origin. For the past twenty years, IIRIRA has dramatically expanded 
who could be deported and cut off numerous ways people used to earn 
status. President Bill Clinton enacted this law — based on political 
calculations rather than sound policy reasons — and President Barack 
Obama relied upon it to deport a record-breaking 2.5 million 
individuals, more than all presidents who oversaw deportations from 
1900 to 2000, combined.272 
Trump is taking the absurdity found in existing law and making it 
ridiculous. But this Article highlights that the problems in our 
immigration policy pre-dated Trump and will persist after him unless 
legislative reform occurs. Federal courts are quietly and slowly 
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revealing that the reliance on crimes as a reason to deport someone is 
overinclusive, leads to arbitrary results, and is at odds with how state 
courts determined whether the offender was dangerous or engaged in 
a dangerous conduct. The lasting absurdity would be for the public 
not to demand legislative fixes to ensure that enforcement of 
immigration is not the only response to immigration matters. By 
repealing IIRIRA, we can return to the old common sense rules that let 
those who contribute to our country — parents of citizens, good 
neighbors, good workers, tax payers, and veterans — earn a way to 
remain and deport only those whose contributions do not outweigh 
any harm they cause. 
